20 November 2007

Leuren Moret, Depleted Uranium Contamination

http://www.consciousmedianetwork.com/members/lmoret.htm

Leuren Moret
Depleted Uranium ContaminationLauren Moret
(Running time = 54 mins)

After working for 5 years at the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab and 2 years at the Livermore nuclear weapons lab, Leuren Moret left Livermore and now dedicates her life to revealing and understanding the actual health effects of radiation exposure.

Leuren contributed to a scientific report on depleted uranium to advise the United Nations' subcommission investigating the illegality of depleted uranium munitions. She has also worked extensively with indigenous people contaminated by radiation from the nuclear weapons program, communities in the US and other countries exposed to radiation from related activities, and communities impacted by radiation from nuclear power plants.

Currently Leuren is helping educate the governments and peoples of the world regarding the dangers of depleted uranium being used in the occupation of Iraq, and the very real possibility that this us is in fact a war crime. With graphic photographs and scientific facts, Leuren drives home the terrible effects of this kind of nuclear war in her presentations.

Leuren also testified in June of 2003 in Japan as an expert on depleted uranium at a public hearing for the international war crimes tribunal, trying President Bush for war crimes in Afghanistan. She is active in a tribunal trying him for war crimes in the U.S. military action in Iraq.

In an article about Depleted Uranium dust Laruen writes, "Exposure pathways for depleted uranium can be through the skin, by inhalation, and ingestion. Nano-particles have high mobility and can easily enter the body. Inhalation of nano-particles of depleted uranium is the most hazardous exposure, because the particles pass through the lung-blood barrier directly into the blood."

"When inhaled through the nose, nano-particles can cross the olfactory bulb directly into the brain through the blood brain barrier, where they migrate all through the brain," she wrote. "Many Gulf era soldiers exposed to depleted uranium have been diagnosed with brain tumors, brain damage and impaired thought processes. Uranium can interfere with the mitochondria, which provide energy for the nerve processes, and transmittal of the nerve signal across synapses in the brain.

Read these article links for more information:

Depleted Uranium Contaminates Europe

nuclear cooperation or nuclear WINDOW DRESSING?

U.S., Russia Agree On Plutonium Disposal

U.S. and Russian officials announced agreement Monday on how to safely dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian weapons-grade plutonium, overcoming a major hurdle in a joint nuclear nonproliferation effort that at times has been close to falling apart.

The two countries, in a joint statement, outlined a plan where Russia agrees to modify its fast-neutron reactors so that they can burn the plutonium, yet ensure that additional plutonium will not be produced.

In turn, the United States, which also will dispose of 34 tons of excess plutonium from its weapons program, will continue to help Russia pay for construction of a plant in Russia to turn the plutonium into a mixed oxide fuel for the reactors and in research of a more advanced reactor that could speed up the disposal process.

The two countries tentatively agreed to the plutonium disposal program seven years ago when it was hailed as a breakthrough in safeguarding some of Russia's nuclear material, but progress stalled because of a variety of disagreements, most recently over how Russia would destroy the plutonium.

Russia's ambivalence in turn caused Congress to balk at approving money for the U.S. portion of the plutonium disposal effort because of what lawmakers called the apparent inability to get Russia to agree on a disposal plan.

Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman and Sergey Kiriyenko, director of Russia's Atomic Energy Agency, Rosatom, in a joint statement outlined a ''mutual understanding'' as to how Russia's plutonium would be disposed of and reiterated both countries' commitment to the program.

The agreement '

'reflects measurable progress towards disposing of a significant amount of weapons grade plutonium in Russia,''
said Bodman in a separate statement released by his office.

William Tobey, deputy administrator at DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration, said in an interview that the agreement should resolve some of the key concerns in Congress and keep the U.S. program on track.

''We nailed down some important details,''
said Tobey.

Among them, he said, was assurance from the Russians that the reactors used to dispose of the plutonium will be modified to burn more than they produce, that the plutonium they produce will not be weapons grade, and that the U.S. contribution will be capped at $400 million.

While viewed as major nonproliferation effort, the plutonium disposition is expected to take several decades and cover only a fraction of the weapons-grade plutonium both countries possess. The United States is believed to have about 100 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and Russia about 140 metric tons.

Nevertheless, former Sen. Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonproliferation advocacy group, called the agreement a ''major advance toward achieving the elimination of enough plutonium to make more than 8,000 nuclear bombs.''

The agreement calls for 34 metric tons of Russia's excess plutonium to be turned into a mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel and then burned in its existing BN600 fast-neutron reactor and in a larger version, the BN800, once it is built. It also calls for continued U.S. help for Russian development of a more advanced gas-turbine reactor that could speed up the disposition.

In recent years the nonproliferation effort has been stymied by Russia's insistence that the plutonium program mesh with the country's expanded civilian nuclear energy programs.

Rosatom plans to implement the plutonium disposition ''within the framework of the strategy for developing Russian nuclear energy,'' says the joint statement.

Disposal would begin in the BN600 reactor in 2012, three years before the United States is scheduled to begin processing plutonium into MOX for use in a commercial reactor. Construction of the $4 billion MOX processing facility is expected to begin next year at the Savannah River nuclear facility in South Carolina where design work already has begun.

The announcement Monday anticipates 1.5 metric tons of Russian plutonium being burned a year once both of Russia's reactors are operating, meaning it will take more than 22 years to destroy the 34 metric tons, once both reactors are operating.

Ed Lyman, nuclear weapons expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said use of the relatively small BN600 reactor ''will put Russian plutonium disposition on the slow track'' because the reactor can burn only about three-tenths of a ton of plutonium a year, and the larger reactor has yet to be built.

Lyman said ''this is a total retreat from the original concept'' which would have disposed of the plutonium in larger light-water reactors, an option the Russian rejected.

George Monbiot on nuclear proliferation and nuclear Israel

Ban the Bomb - But Only in Iran

When will Bush and Brown acknowledge that there is already a nuclear power in the Middle East?

By George Monbiot. Published in the Guardian 20th November 2007

George Bush and Gordon Brown are right: there should be no nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The risk of a nuclear conflagration could be greater there than anywhere else. Any nation developing them should expect a firm diplomatic response. So when will they impose sanctions on Israel?

Like them, I believe that Iran is trying to acquire the bomb. I also believe it should be discouraged, by a combination of economic pressure and bribery, from doing so (a military response would of course be disastrous). I believe that Bush and Brown - who maintain their nuclear arsenals in defiance of the non-proliferation treaty - are in no position to lecture anyone else. But if, as Mr Bush claims, the proliferation of such weapons “would be a dangerous threat to world peace”(1), why does neither man mention the fact that Israel, according to a secret briefing by the US Defense Intelligence Agency, possesses between 60 and 80 of them?(2)

Officially, the Israeli government maintains a position of “nuclear ambiguity”: neither confirming nor denying its possession of nuclear weapons. But everyone who has studied the issue knows that this is a formula with a simple purpose: to give the United States an excuse to keep breaking its own laws, which forbid it to grant aid to a country with unauthorised weapons of mass destruction(3). The fiction of ambiguity is fiercely guarded. In 1986, when the nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu handed photographs of Israel’s bomb factory to the Sunday Times, he was lured from Britain to Rome, drugged and kidnapped by Mossad agents, tried in secret and sentenced to 18 years. He served 12 of them in solitary confinement and was banged up again - for six months - soon after he was released.

But in December last year, the Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert accidentally let slip that Israel, like “America, France and Russia” had nuclear weapons(4). Opposition politicians were furious. They attacked him for “a lack of caution bordering on irresponsibility.”(5) But US aid continues to flow without impediment.

As the fascinating papers released last year by the National Security Archive show, the US government was aware in 1968 that Israel was developing a nuclear device (what it didn’t know is that the first one had already been built by then).(6) The contrast to the efforts now being made to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb could scarcely be starker.

At first, US diplomats urged the government to make its sale of 50 F4 Phantom jets conditional on Israel’s abandonment of its nuclear programme. As a note sent from the Near East Bureau to the Secretary of State in October 1968 reveals, the order would make the US “the principal supplier of Israel’s military needs” for the first time. In return it should require “commitments that would make it more difficult for Israel to take the critical decision to go nuclear.”(7) Such pressure, the memo suggested, was urgently required: France had just delivered the first of a consignment of medium range missiles, and Israel intended to equip them with nuclear warheads.

Twenty days later, on November 4th 1968, when the assistant defense secretary met Yitzhak Rabin (then the Israeli ambassador to Washington), Rabin “did not dispute in any way our information on Israel’s nuclear or missile capability”(8). He simply refused to discuss it. Four days after that, Rabin announced that the proposal was “completely unacceptable to us”(9). On November 27th, Lyndon Johnson’s administration accepted Israel’s assurance that “it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons”(10).

As the memos show, US officials knew that this assurance had been broken even before it was made. A record of a phone conversation between Henry Kissinger and another official in July 1969 reveals that Richard Nixon was “very leary of cutting off the Phantoms”(11), despite Israel’s blatant disregard of the agreement. The deal went ahead, and from then on the US administration sought to bamboozle its own officials in order to defend Israel’s lie. In August 1969, US officials were sent to “inspect” Israel’s Dimona nuclear plant. But a memo from the State Department reveals that “the US government is not prepared to support a “real” inspection effort in which the team members can feel authorised to ask directly pertinent questions and/or insist on being allowed to look at records, logs, materials and the like. The team has in many subtle ways been cautioned to avoid controversy, “be gentlemen” and not take issue with the obvious will of the hosts.”(12) Nixon refused to pass the minutes of the conversation he’d had with the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to the US Ambassador To Israel, Wally Barbour(13). Meir and Nixon appear to have agreed that the Israeli programme could go ahead, as long as it was kept secret.

The US government has continued to protect it. Every six months, the intelligence agencies provide Congress with a report on technology acquired by foreign states that’s “useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction.” These reports discuss the programmes in India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and other nations, but not in Israel(14). Whenever other states have tried to press Israel to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the US and European governments have blocked them(15). Israel has also exempted itself from the biological and chemical weapons conventions(16).

By refusing to sign these treaties, it ensures that it needs never be inspected. While the IAEA’s inspectors crawl round Iran’s factories, put seals on its uranium tanks and blow the whistle when it fails to cooperate, they have no legal authority to inspect facilities in Israel(17). So when the Israeli government complains, as it did last week, that the head of the IAEA is “sticking his head in the sand over Iran’s nuclear programme”(18), you can only gape at its chutzpah. Israel is constantly racking up the pressure for action against Iran, aware that no powerful state will press for action against Israel.

Yes, Iran under Ahmadinejad is a dangerous and unpredictable state involved in acts of terror abroad. The president is a Holocaust denier opposed to the existence of Israel. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran responded to Saddam Hussein’s toxic bombardments with chemical weapons of its own. But Israel under Ehud Olmert is also a dangerous and unpredictable state involved in acts of terror abroad. Two months ago it bombed a site in Syria (whose function is fiercely disputed). Last year it launched a war of aggression against Lebanon. It remains in occupation of Palestinian lands. In February 2001, according to the BBC, it used chemical weapons in Gaza: 180 people were admitted to hospital with severe convulsions(19). Nuclear weapons in Israel’s hands are surely just as dangerous as nuclear weapons in Iran’s.

So when will our governments speak up? When will they acknowledge that there is already a nuclear power in the Middle East, and that it presents an existential threat to its neighbours? When will they admit that Iran is not starting a nuclear arms race, but joining one? When will they demand that the rules they impose on Iran should also apply to Israel?

www.monbiot.com

References:

1. George Bush, 17th October 2007. Press Conference by the President. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071017.html

2. US DIA, July 1999. The Decades Ahead, 1999-202. Extracted at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html

3. Luke Harding and Duncan Campbell, 13th December 2006. The Guardian.

4. Greg Myre, 12th December 2006. In a Slip, Israel’s Leader Seems to Confirm Its Nuclear Arsenal. New York Times.

5. Yossi Beilin, quoted by Luke Harding and Duncan Campbell, ibid.

6. The archive can be viewed here: http://www.gwu.edu:80/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm

7. Parker T. Hart, NEA, 15th October 1968. Memo to the Secretary of State. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-02.pdf

8. Department of Defense, 4th November 1968. Memorandum of Conversation. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-03a.pdf

9. Department of Defense, 8th November 1968. Memorandum of Conversation. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-03b.pdf

10. Paul C Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense, 27th November 1968. Letter to Yitzhak Rabin. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-03d.pdf

11. Henry Kissinger and Elliot Richardson, 16th July 1969. Phone conversation. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-12.pdf

12. Department of State, 13th August 1969. Memorandum of Conversation. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-16b.pdf

13. Harold H. Saunders, the White House, 8th December 1969. Record of the President’s Talk with Golda Meir. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-26.pdf

14. Joseph Cirincione, 11th March 2005. Iran and Israel’s Nuclear Weapons.
http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3217

15. No author given, 20th September 2006. Arab states urge IAEA to slam Israel for atomic arsenal. Haaretz.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/765538.html

16. It has signed but not ratified the CWC. It has not signed the BWC.

17. Mohamed ElBaradei, 27th July 2004. Interview with Al-Ahram News. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2004/alahram27072004.html

18. Shaul Mofaz, deputy prime minister, quoted by Tim Butcher,12th November 2007. Israel calls for sacking of IAEA’s ElBaradei. Daily Telegraph.

19. Correspondent, 17th March 2003. Israel’s Secret Weapon. BBC Two. http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/correspondent/transcripts/17_03_2003.txt


19 November 2007

A little more on Economic and Political weekly; nuclear fantasie and more

Wish WE had a journal like this!!

THE HANDSTAND

DECEMBER 2005

The Invisible Intellectual

By Sudhanva Deshpande
ZNet Commentary
March 14, 2004


Unobtrusive, withdrawn, almost shy, he died as he lived: quietly, without fuss, in his sleep. Krishna Raj was responsible for creating, single-handedly, one of the most incredible intellectual institutions of our times, a journal called Economic and Political Weekly (EPW).

India boasts of one of the most vibrant democratic intellectual cultures anywhere in the world, even if the actual realization of political democracy on the ground remains imperfect, uneven, flawed, skewed, and currently - under the right wing dispensation that rules at the centre and in several states - under grave threat. The mark of this democratic intellectual culture is the vast variety of opinion that gets expressed in the media, and indeed in the very wide range of platforms that are available, in spite of growing corporatization of the media, for the thinking and concerned citizen to air his or her views.

While India has more than a dozen major languages - and each one of these languages has a robust intellectual and political culture - English is today undeniably the major language of intellectual discourse. And it is in English that we have four remarkable periodicals.

One is Mainstream, a magazine analysing current affairs, edited for long years by the late Nikhil Chakravartty. Then there is Seminar, a monthly devoted to debating a single problem from a variety of standpoints in each issue, edited by the husband-wife team of Raj and Romesh Thapar. Neither is alive today, but the journal continues publication with vigour. The youngest publication is Frontline, a newsmagazine edited by N. Ram.

While Mainstream has lost some of its sparkle after the death of its founder editor, Seminar, by its very nature, only commissions articles and caters to a somewhat shifting readership in each issue. Aijaz Ahmad, in the preface of his latest book 'Iraq, Afghanistan and the Imperialism of Our Time', rates Frontline the best English language newsmagazine anywhere in the world, and his verdict is hard to contest. But it is also to be noted that Frontline is the publication of The Hindu, a family-owned group of newspapers with a long and distinguished history, manned by professional journalists.

The most remarkable in this list of remarkable publications, the most open, democratic platform, is EPW.

To those unacquainted with India, it would be hard to explain the enormity of EPW's prestige and its achievements. Unlike any academic journal I know of from anywhere in the world, EPW was born, and has remained, a weekly.

For close to forty years, the journal's pages have been a clearing house of serious ideas on politics, economics, history, sociology, anthropology, and often the sciences as well. In addition to its weekly quota of some four or five academic papers, EPW also publishes, every year, reviews of agriculture, labour, industry, management and gender studies, consisting of about half a dozen commissioned papers by leading authorities in each field.

The very best of Indian social science research has been published by EPW, and often non-Indian academics have chosen to publish theoretical papers here rather than in journals of the west. As an academic journal, EPW holds its own against the best in the world. I have personally known academics who have waited for an year or more to get their name into EPW, for being published there is a mark of recognition for the quality of your research. An EPW citation invariably occupies pride of place in the curriculum vitae of a young scholar in any university anywhere in the world.

In this democratic republic of ideas, an unknown research scholar from an obscure part of the land gets as much space and prominence as an Amartya Sen or Romila Thapar. Over the years, senior bureaucrats, behind the protective shield of pseudonyms, have used the columns of EPW to critique government policy.

There is not a single debate of academic or political importance that has not animated its pages over the last three decades or more, be it the mode of production debate, or the question of imperialism, or underdevelopment, or the debt crisis of the third world, or the debates around subaltern historiography, or on the nature and direction of the Indian polity, or on questions of gender, caste, culture and environment. And remarkably for what was, for a long time, viewed as a journal of the (non-party) left, EPW has opened its pages to virtually every shade of rigorous thought.

But unlike any scholarly journal I know, EPW has also provided lavish space to commentaries on current issues, to columns by a number of top-class but somewhat idiosyncratic writers, to pithy and incisive editorials on a bewildering range of subjects of public concern, and to longer pieces that set out to provoke academic or political debate. In addition, EPW also publishes tables and tables of impeccably researched economic data and statistics, a lively letters to the editor column, and book reviews as well as review articles.

EPW defies every stereotype. It is a small, independent journal employing some twenty staff members on less than modest wages, but its professionalism is the envy of the best and biggest. Not a single issue has ever been delayed for any reason, including the death of its editor. Every single piece that appears in EPW is carefully and meticulously edited for style as well as content. It looks spartan, unostentatious, it is printed on inexpensive newsprint, carries no photographs, and makes no concessions to visual flourish, not even the use of fine typefaces or comfortable inter-line leading.

It is page after page of tightly composed text, and expects to be read with the same urgency as a dictionary or medical reference book. In fact, its functionality is itself an aesthetic, like those old, rugged, metal-bodied SLR cameras.

For a publication that looks nearly intimidating, EPW has phenomenal reach and circulation. University dons as much as undergraduates, corporate bigwigs and financial sector managers, bureaucrats and political leaders, social and political activists, anybody who has anything to do with the world of ideas and the state of the nation reads EPW.

We have all grown up on EPW, debating passionately this or that question that the journal threw at us, waiting anxiously for the issue next week to see how the debate was turning out. And the thrill of receiving the first acceptance note from the editor would surpass for a young scholar the thrill of many weightier honours in future life.

In the 1990s, as the neoliberal reform programme of the Indian economy gathered pace, EPW switched sides and began arguing in favour of the policies of liberalization and globalization.

Opinion on this policy shift was bitterly divided. Left intellectuals, particularly economists, felt a sense of betrayal, rightly so, and some of the best known among them boycotted EPW, perhaps not so rightly. Non- and anti-left liberals welcomed the change, celebrating EPW's 'glasnost'. Whatever one's opinion on the editorial shift, it is uncontested that the journal itself maintained high standards and commanded huge readership.

There is simply no getting away from it: EPW is a magnificent and unique intellectual institution.

On the left, we often think of movements as being more important than individuals, and perhaps they are, but in the process we underrate the individuals who build structures that enable movements to live and thrive.

Krishna Raj was one such man.

A master editor of other people's writing, he also wrote editorials on virtually every subject with care, economy and power. EPW is not a refereed journal. It didn't need to be, not with Krishna Raj in charge. He could debate with the best on most issues, but he chose an anonymous existence, never appearing on television, never granting interviews in print, never signing petitions.

Of all of India's public intellectuals, Krishna Raj was without doubt the most invisible, though arguably the most influential. EPW was his life's passion, his stage and his voice. The journal is what it is because of him, and it is a perfect reflection of his own personality: open, inviting, rigorous, unostentatious, quiet, curious, understated, fiercely independent, forceful.

And his personal integrity was at all times absolutely above the slightest reproach. Even when he turned pro-globalization, he did so not for personal gain - the only individual about whom I can say this - but because he genuinely believed he was right.

Apart from earning for EPW unprecedented stature and goodwill, Krishna Raj also put in place managerial and professional structures - including the ability to raise advertising revenue - that will ensure that EPW will continue to flourish for a long time to come. True to character then, Krishna Raj has ensured that we will not miss him.

But we still will; even those of us who, like me, had minimal personal contact with that gentle, charming man. He touched us all.
........................................................................................

EXAMPLE OF EPW ARTICLE

BOOK REVIEW: India's Nuclear Fantasies: Costs and Ethics

Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream (Itty Abraham In 'Economic and Political Weekly' Dated 28th June 2003)

This volume is the latest and most com- prehensive collection of essays arguing against nuclear weapons in the sub-continent, taking forward and adding to the findings, insights and arguments found in Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik’s path-breaking South Asia on a Short Fuse1 and Smithu Kothari and Zia Mian’s extensive collection of essays and opinion pieces published following the tests of 1998.2

Amartya Sen’s essay, ‘India and the Bomb’, offers the most direct entry point to some of the key questions at stake in the nuclear problem in south Asia. His lucid contribution raises a number of critical issues that can be used to map other articles which go into particular issues in greater depth. These include the tactical and strategic costs of the tests, implications of nuclearisation at a global level, the cost factor, the ethics of nuclearisation, and the anxieties of a post-colonial elite.

On the central question of what India gained from going nuclear, Sen’s answer is, very little. At the domestic politics level, it didn’t help the BJP win state elections. At the tactical level Sen says nuclearisation constrained Indian conventional military options in the efforts to expel the intruders and regain the heights of Kargil.

At the strategic level, it allowed Pakistan to overcome its conventional weakness and claim parity with India on a nuclear scale. These points and the dangers inherent in the Kargil conflict are brought to the fore by Ejaz Haider, a senior editor of Lahore’s Daily Times and Friday Times, in one of the few pieces in the volume not written by an analyst of Indian origin. He reminds us that at least a dozen nuclear threats were made by officials on either side during the conflict, making a mockery of the idea of nuclear weapons deterring conflict; the reverse if anything was true. In fact, he argues, nuclear weapons emboldened the Pakistani military leadership to undertake the operation in the first place. “Pakistan saw its nuclear weapons capability as an ‘equaliser’ against India’s conventional military superiority” (p 136). Ultimately, he notes, international pressure prevented escalation and allowed the cessation of conflict, another blow to Indian strategic policy which seeks to keep the region free of foreign influence.

At the global level, nuclearisation alienated China and hardly furthered Indian ambitions to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Kanti Bajpai addresses the China question directly. He argues that while Indian decision-makers have seen in China the ultimate rationale for their nuclear programme, this perception is fatally flawed. Bajpai demonstrates this in two ways: first, by an examination of China’s India policy and foreign policy objectives, and second, by discussing the China-Pakistan relationship. He notes that “India has never figured in China’s threat cosmology in any serious fashion” (p 36). While Bajpai is realist enough to argue that the Middle Kingdom needs to be watched carefully and that India’s relative ‘military weakness’ is being ignored (p 39), he notes that China has already obtained what it needs as regards the contested border. In other words, in relation to India, China is the status quo power, India the revisionist one. Bajpai stresses the value of the ongoing rounds of discussions between the two countries and suggests that it is hardly in India’s interest to create a permanent enemy of China. That may be so, the hardliners would say, but what of Chinese support of Pakistan? In the most provocative section of his paper, he offers a series of hypothetical reasons for Chinese support of Pakistan, all of which have nothing to do with India. His basic point is, does China really need Pakistan to deter or defeat India? Although Chinese support for Pakistan makes India edgy and nervous, is China supporting Pakistan for other reasons altogether? Bajpai proposes that Chinese assistance to Pakistan has more to do with rewarding Pakistan for its constantcy, limiting US influence in the region, and keeping Muslim separatists in Xinjiang in check.

If this assistance upsets India, that’s a price China is willing to pay. Bajpai suggests that perhaps Pakistan has also shared western military technology with China, for which there is not yet much evidence. What seems more plausible is that Pakistan is also valuable to China in relation to North Korea, offering a low cost and hands-off means of subverting US non-proliferation policy and support for Taiwan. Some of these questions should have been answered in Ye Zhengjia’s disarmingly direct paper on India-China relations. Yet in the ‘officially correct’ manner typical of Chinese scholars of international relations, Ye completely avoids mention of the unpleasant subject of Chinese relations with Pakistan. The paper correctly points out that there still remains a great deal of misunderstanding in India of Chinese motivations, in my view a combination of ignorance bolstered by neo-orientalist western journalism and the absence of a critical mass of first rate scholars of China in India.

All in all, Sen concludes, nuclearisation has set back India’s “national self-defence” vis-a-vis its neighbours. To this prudential concern – was the decision sensible? – is then added the ethical concern of the ‘rightness or wrongness’ of the policy itself. The ethical issue, he argues, is in turn a prudential matter of the highest importance as it is a factor in how we assess each other’s actions. The now present threat of massive devastation and mass murder in the subcontinent cannot, under any circumstances, be considered an ethical policy, especially when set against India’s historic opposition to nuclear weapons.

The ethical questions raised by the nuclearisation of south Asia cannot be dismissed as mere debating points for armchair philosophers. A strong ethical stance underwrote longstanding – for half a century – Indian demands for global nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nuclear weapons convention, and bolstered its opposition to the nuclear asymmetry enshrined in the US-led non-proliferation regime. In retrospect, India’s self-imposed restraint after testing in 1974 added to the moral weight of these demands. These arguments reached their short-lived zenith – and acquired quasi-legal standing – when India submitted a Memorial to the International Court of Justice as it prepared its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons.

Siddharth Mallavarapu presents the details of this historic ruling in his contribution to the volume. Two key aspects of the opinion are worth repeating. First, the special nature of nuclear weapons is clarified; second, the weakening of the principle of national self-defence, insofar as the court agued that self-defence could not be considered independent of principles of humanitarian law. But in the end, the court blinked. It “[could not] conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme case of self-defence in which the very survival of the state would be at stake” (p 255).

While for a long time, it could be taken as obvious that it was the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons that set them apart from other weapons, this position weakened with the development of battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and the enormous leaps in destructive capacity of conventional munitions, especially in the US arsenal. This helps us clarify that it is the long-term effects of nuclear weapons, namely its radiation and environmental effects, which not only affect the present, but which threaten the well-being of future generations and the survival of the eco-system, that make nuclear weapons truly stand apart as weapons of mass destruction.

The effects of radiation are unfortunately already with us. M V Ramana, a physicist and environmentalist at Princeton, and Surendra Gadekar, scientist and co-founder of the anti-nuclear journal Anumukthi, walk us through the horrific effects of the production cycle of the Indian nuclear programme, from the mining of uranium to the fabrication of fuel rods, to waste, reprocessing and testing, and discuss environmental impacts such as ground-water contamination. They make it absolutely clear that in India it makes no sense at all to separate the ‘civilian’ and the ‘military’ programmes on the basis of final use, as some political parties and anti-nuclear groups do, when in practice these systems are completely fused. The evidence presented would have been even more effective if the authors had included a map showing the location of the different sites of reprocessing, production, and extraction, the areas of greatest contamination and their proximity to areas of dense settlement, and the likely routes that nuclear materials and wastes travel across the country. Elsewhere Ramana et al calculated that India has to cope with 5,000 cubic metres (the equivalent of five Olympic-size swimming pools) of high level waste from reprocessing.3 High level waste contains 99 per cent of the total radioactivity from all wastes produced. The harmful effects of this waste will be with us for thousands of years, and there is more being produced daily. Given this, it is not surprising that Thomas George, a physician, describes nuclear weapons as biological weapons (p 449) in his useful summary of the physical effects of radiation on the human body. In a conclusion that brings us into the realm of horror films, he reminds us that following the devastation of nuclear conflagration, insects will rule the world.

The principle of self-defence, an indispensable element of a state’s claim to sovereignty, has long been held as inviolable. But India’s submission to the court noted that even this principle has its limits. In its brief India cited proportionality – the idea that the use of force even for legitimate defence has to be proportionate to the means and ends of the attack; that the use of force must cease once other means, i e, diplomacy, become available; and that where reprisal involves nuclear weapons, their use becomes subject to international humanitarian law. Humanitarian law precludes the targeting of non-combatants and proscribes their needless suffering. The use of nuclear weapons promises both. And if the law is not enough, the Indian submission speaks directly to the non-ethics of deterrence: “deterrence has been considered abhorrent to human sentiment since it implies that a state, if required to defend its own existence, will act with pitiless disregard for the consequences of its [actions on its] own and adversary’s people” (pp 260-61).

We still do not fully understand the transformation that took place between 1996 and 1998. In a matter of two years, the same country that issued the statements above conducted five nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear state. As Sen puts it: “The claim that subcontinental nuclearisation would somehow help to bring about world nuclear disarmament is a wild dream that can only precede a nightmare” (p 187). The easy explanation blames the whole mess on the BJP, or, as Krishna Ananth suggests, on the entire Indian ruling elite.

Political scientist Srirupa Roy agues that the decision to go nuclear must be seen in historical context, situated and justifed within a coherent set of post-colonial state discourses, hence both the origins and the impact of nuclearisation lie outside the nuclear question, narrowly construed. Just as contemporary Hindu nationalism is less of a break from the past than is often imagined, the official frame of Indian nationalism offered the resources, conceptual and material, for a government that sought to go nuclear. “Just as it is impossible to ignore the fact that Hindu nationalism has emerged in India through the working of the existing democratic process, it is also impossible to ignore the ways in which a nuclear India draws upon and reproduces familiar and unquestioned assumptions about national identity and state-society relations” (p 350). Or, by the same logic, going nuclear seeks to affirm and strengthen ‘official’ Indian nationalism. This is tricky ground, because it also forces us to think why forms of destruction become the means by which state continuity and ideological affirmation get reproduced. Is the answer militarism, defined by economist Jean Dreze as “the propensity to use military power, or the threat of it, for political settlement” (p 280), or is it even more structural, an inherent feature of the modern or postcolonial state? The endemic nature of modern warfare and its disproportionate effects in the developing world suggest the latter; be that as it may, it is impossible to deny the staggering impact of war on the process of development, including “material and psychological deprivations associated with entitlement failures, health crises, physical violence, forced displacement, ...[destruction of] productive infrastructure, public services, settlement patterns, environmental resources, social capital and the institutions of governance” (pp 312-13).

The full and sunk costs of nuclearisation are as yet unknown, but economist and journalist Rammanohar Reddy offers a careful and even conservative analysis of the likely costs of the programme in the future. It is worth remembering that the Brookings study of the US nuclear programme, which estimated a total cost of $5 trillion dollars over a half century, found that nuclear weapons themselves were a rather small proportion of the overall costs. Reddy estimates, at a minimum over the next 10 years, the cost of nuclear weapons at Rs 650 crore, the cost of delivery systems at Rs 17,000 crore, the cost of C4I2 (command and control) at Rs 16,000 crore, or Rs 34,000 crore over the decade. When other costs are factored in, including the costs of operating this system, it works out to Rs 7,000-8,000 crore per annum at 1998-99 prices, approximately 0.5 per cent of India’s GDP (pp 273-93), equivalent to the “annual cost of introducing universal elementary education in India” (p 394). Put another way, 7-8 paise of every tax rupee will be spent on this programme (p 393). But what is worse is that these expenditures on nuclear weapons will, in all likelihood, take place alongside an increase in India’s conventional military budget, already 2 per cent of GDP.

Dreze argues that democracies are less likely to be militaristic (in the sense defined above), but notes soberingly that democracy itself is a casualty of militarism. The threats to Indian democracy are real. Nuclear affairs are protected under the colonial era origin Offical Secrets Act with the post-colonial Atomic Energy Act thrown in for good measure. The first casualty of official secrecy is visible in the data used in this volume. Due to the lack of data available from Indian sources, Ramana and Gadekar constantly turn to international comparisons and estimates drawn from extrapolations from international data. Rammanohar Reddy in his analysis of the economics of the Indian nuclear programme adopts the same technique, while making amends for its limitations. With little public information available on India and Pakistan’s planned command and control infrastructures, physicist and activist Zia Mian does a superb job of drawing together existing sources and borrowing from the US experience to construct a careful and comprehensive argument showing the complexity and risks inherent in such an organisation. His point is that there are huge risks ‘built in’, even when the system is working well within its stated parameters.

With all these arguments and data together making a comprehensive case for the lack of benefits from, and the dangers and ethical consequences of nuclearisation, how is it possible that such a programme continues unabated? Sen helps us get a little deeper into this question when he narrows in on the grievances held by Indian elites, and sets them in an international context. He reminds us that India’s scientist-president, Abdul Kalam, is kind-hearted, mild-mannered, amiable, philanthropic, and, an intense nationalist who greeted the bomb with joy. Kalam is a product of what I have elsewhere termed the “strategic enclave” of Indian state scientists,4 the focus of articles by M V Ramana and Amulya K Reddy. Ramana recounts in now familiar detail the important story of how the scientists around Homi Bhabha, present at the founding of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, have become a de facto bomb lobby, restrained only by political leaders. The distinguished scientist Amulya Reddy explores the complicity of modern science with large-scale destruction. He reminds us of the qualitatively new levels of destruction that were reached in second world war by both sides, thanks to the scientisation of death, from genocide in Auschwitz and the concentration camps to the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the only hitherto recorded use of nuclear weapons. This complicity is not necessary, but comes from a failure of morality and will. Reddy notes with dismay how the scientific establishment in India either greeted the tests with joy or remained silent. His diagnosis of the scientific community in India is sociological. He argues that the lure of state patronage post-independence marked the initial fall from grace: with it went scientific independence. Symptoms of decay include the lack of a “community of interacting scientists” (p 198), the “manipulation” of peer review, the marginalisation of unorthodox thinking, and, most telling, the absence of scientific controversies. His insight that the “decoupling” of science and technology in India has led to “abnormality” is also the context for a plea that the natural work of science in India is to address “the country’s defining characteristic and fundamental reality” – poverty (pp 197, 199). Unfortunately, the poverty of Indian state science precludes consideration of this reality.

The grievances held by Indian nuclear scientists may be generalised across the Indian elite, especially the political class. Their obsession is to be taken more seriously – how often do we hear that India is the world’s largest democracy, produces the second (or is it third?) largest pool of scientists and engineers in the world, etc, etc – but this obsession is symptomatic of global tensions that work in contradictory ways. On the one hand, we have to take seriously the fact that considerable segments of the upper middle class urban populations of India delighted in the decision to ‘go nuclear’, whether they voted for the BJP or not.5 Getting the attention of US media and policy-makers remains, for the still-to-be-decolonised, the only measure of world success. They remain oblivious to Sen’s insight regarding their “overestimation of the persuasive power of the bomb [...] and underestimation of the political, cultural, scientific, and economic strength of the country” (p 186). The crudeness of their response, on the other hand, should not blind us to the degree to which American imperial power and military force has become the currency of the day, forcing into disrepute alternative forms of public diplomacy and non-coercive international relations. American-style realism is not alien to India. The constituent assembly debates demonstrate that realism of this kind has been an element of elite discourse about India since independence, a discourse that until given centre-stage by the Hindu right remained embarrassing and marginal. But global nuclear relations have always been the site for the clearest representation of a grossly unequal world system which sanctions weapons of mass destruction only in the hands of a select few. In fact, a simplistic and not unreasonable lesson to learn from contemporary US responses to North Korea and Iraq is how much the presence of nuclear weapons appear to count.

In other words, once we set the south Asian nuclear equation in global terms, the ethical and the prudent diverge sharply. While there is still no substitute, from the point of view of human security, to general and global disarmament, is it a prudent strategy to wait until the difficult conditions for such an agreement are made possible? Or, is it necessary to work on multiple fronts simultaneously, from the regional to the global, seeking to reduce the very real threat of nuclear conflagration wherever possible? Adopting the latter, pragmatic, position is not without its own dilemmas. It means that anti-nuclear activists in south Asia join hands with some elements of the nuclear establishment who argue that the global nuclear forces are no less a threat to world security and that simultaneous reductions in global and regional arsenals are necessary: the adoption of a rigorous and verifiable global convention on nuclear weapons is the minimum goal of such joint efforts. This is not a trivial concern: the rise of US triumphalism has coincided with reports that indicate pressure building up for a resumption of testing and the development of a new generation of US tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, the south Asia anti-nuclear movement must continue its efforts towards mutual restraint in the region.

Should these efforts stop short of rollback for the time being? In the present political conjuncture, there is a case to be made for the presence of nuclear weapons in the region, not to deter the US from attack, but as a form of pressure and bargaining chip that may yet force decision-makers in Washington to reduce their own immense arsenal, based ultimately on their fear of weapons in the hands of people unlike them. This is a dangerous position to adopt; using nuclear weapons as means to an end is a deeply problematic position to take, whether justified in terms of destructive or progressive ends. An interim and unhappy solution offers itself in the formation of a new international regime on the lines of the missile technology control regime (MTCR) which would seek to bring the five old nuclear powers, India, Pakistan and Israel into a mutually binding compact. Such a move would mean the effective end of the discriminatory non-proliferation regime, which is perhaps on its last legs anyway, and its replacement with a new discriminatory system whose only saving grace is that it puts a hold on the expansion of nuclear weapons in south Asia and globally. This would delight the pro-bomb lobby in both India and Pakistan for symbolic reasons but would also impose a form of restraint on them that would make military adventures of the kind south Asia has become all too familiar with in the last few years much more difficult to pull off. Such is the definition of pragmatic.

Whether these proposals are viable or not, the anti-nuclear movement in south Asia, in India in particular, is faced with a dilemma. Five years from the time that the national security states in India and Pakistan formally declared themselves weapons-capable through a series of nuclear tests, little progress has been made in rolling back or capping the nuclear juggernaut in either country. The movement has been proven correct in its analysis – the risks inherent in nuclearisation and misguided faith in the false god of deterrence have been made manifestly visible to all but the wilfully ‘Blind Men of Hindoostan’.6 Being correct, however, is no guarantor of positive change. What restraint there is in the system – declarations of no first use, no further testing, continued adherence to a limited set of confidence-building measures – has been self-imposed by those who decided to carry out these tests. The anti-nuclear movement cannot really take credit for these marginally positive developments nor can it fall back, for all the reasons expressed in this volume, on a wholly justified but politically vacuous response of ‘I told you so’.

In the last instance, India and Pakistan are unlikely to shelve their own programmes once and for all unless enormous pressure is put on them from all fronts. These include the international, the economic and the political. To the extent that the latter front has remained underdeveloped, it remains a fertile zone for the anti-nuclear movement to exploit. In India, this means above all transforming the mindset of regional political formations into taking positions on ‘national’ issues. There are local reasons for doing so, as the cost of sanctions against India for its nuclear follies are disproportionately felt in some parts of the country rather than others, but also because not to do so allows the ostensibly national parties such as the BJP and Congress to fill this vacuum and monopolise some policies ‘in the name of the nation’. As heterogeneous coalitions become the standard form of governance in New Delhi, vernacular nationalisms rooted in local struggles and expressing diverse interests hold out the promise of less bellicose and aggressive expressions of Indian national interest. Only then might it be possible to confront the costs and ethics of India’s nuclear fantasies.

Notes

1 Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999.
2 Smithu Kothari and Zia Mian, eds, Out of the Nuclear Shadow, Zed Books, London and New York, 2001.
3 M V Ramana, Dennis Thomas and Susy Varghese, ‘Estimating Nuclear Waste Production in India, Current Science, 81, no 11 (December 10, 2001), pp 1458-62. Cited on p 433.
4 Itty Abraham, ‘India’s ‘Strategic Enclave’: Civilian Scientists and Military Technologies’, Armed Forces and Society, 18, 2, (Winter 1992), pp 231-52.
5 We still lack rigorous public opinion data on the views of non-elite and non-metropolitan Indians and Pakistanis. Some of the surprising results that may emerge are prefigured in the study of 200 rural and urban Sindhis conducted by Haider Nizamani and reported in ‘Whose Bomb Is It Anyway?’. Full text available on http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/gsc_activities/nizamani.page/
6 K Sundarji, ‘Blind Men of Hindoostan’, Vikas, New Delhi, 1987.

And some global viewpoints on nuclear proliferation ..

The Economic and Political Weekly carries many fine articles on India's political, economic and social system.

I went hunting there to see the nuclear items they publish.

What IS interesting is that moral questions find room to be published so that they can be publically debated, and most of the articles will even highlight that that is the POINT.

Here are the links as listed and then below I have chosen a comment from one of them to show you how well crafted and timely these articles actually are. I think that they are all worth a read.

Nuclear Weapons

South Asia Needs a Bomb-Less Deal

Pervez Hoodbhoy

Nuclear Disarmament

Achin Vanaik

North Korea Test as Spur to Nuclear Disarmament

Ramesh Thakur

Fallout from Nuclear Deal

R Rajaraman

A Nation’s Shame

none

Nuclear Power

Economics of Nuclear Power: Subsidies and Competitiveness

M V Ramana

Nuclear Power in India

M R Srinivasan , R B Grover , S A Bhardwaj

High Costs, Questionable Benefits of Reprocessing

J Y Suchitra , M V Ramana

Economics of Nuclear Power in India

Sudhinder Thakur

False Assumption of Nuclear Deal

Amulya K N Reddy

Heavy Subsidies in Heavy Water: Economics of Nuclear Power in India

M V Ramana

<<:>> <<:>> <<:>>


South Asia Needs a Bomb-Less Deal

PERVEZ HOODBHOY

The US-India nuclear accord will exacerbate the arms race between
India and Pakistan and threatens to accelerate nuclear
weaponisation by both countries. The sane course is for the two
countries to negotiate a fissile cut-off pact, which may well create
positive ripple effects in China and the US as well.
Criminal Behaviour

But instances of criminal nuclear
behaviour are to be found even in the very
recent past. For example, India’s defence
minister George Fernandes told the International
Herald Tribune on June 3, 2002
that “India can survive a nuclear attack,
but Pakistan cannot”. Indian defence secretary
Yogendra Narain had at that time
taken things a step further in an interview
with Outlook: “A surgical strike is the
answer”, adding that if this failed to resolve
things, “We must be prepared for
total mutual destruction”. On the Pakistani
side, at the peak of the 2002 crisis, General
Musharraf had threatened that Pakistan
would use “unconventional means” against
India if necessary.

Given the roller coaster nature of regional
politics, it is quite likely that similar tense
times will return at some point in the future.
But Indian and Pakistani leaders are likely
to once again abdicate from their own responsibilities
whenever that happens.

Instead, they will again entrust disaster
prevention to US diplomats and officials,
as well occasionally to those from Britain.
Of course, it would be absurd to lay the
blame on the US for all that has gone
wrong between the two countries. Surely
the US does not want to destabilise the
subcontinent, and it does not want a south
Asian holocaust. But one must be aware
that for the US this is only a peripheral
interest – the core of its interest in south
Asian nuclear issues stems from the need
to limit Chinese power and influence, fear
of Al Qaida and Muslim extremism, and
the associated threat of nuclear terrorism.
The Americans will sort out their business
and priorities as they see fit. But it
is unwise to participate in a game that
leaves the south Asian neighbours at each
other’s throats while benefiting a power
that sits on the other end of the globe. The
real question is: what actions would best
serve the interest of the peoples of India
and Pakistan, as well as of China? The
answer lies in moving away from the mad
homicidal urges that have come to possess
south Asian ruling elites.

Many years ago, all three countries
crossed the point where they could lay
cities to waste and kill millions in a matter
of minutes. The fantastically cruel logic,
known as nuclear deterrence, requires only
the certainty that one nuclear bomb will
be able to penetrate the adversary’s defences
and land in the heart of a city. No
one has the slightest doubt that this capability
was crossed multiple times over
during the past few decades.
Delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons
have also multiplied and increased in accuracy,
as well the ability to avoid detection
and interception. Indian militarism is far
more ambitious than Pakistan’s – which
is fundamentally constrained by economic
and manpower resources. India is reportedly
developing MIRV capability for
delivering its nuclear warheads. A latent
worry in the US is that India may even
develop an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM), and perhaps also develop countermeasures
to penetrate American missile
defences. Technological progress will
inevitably bring with it limitless dangerous
possibilities. Unless rationality is brought
to bear, every crazy idea will be pursued
just because it is possible to do so.

Best Hope

The time for a fissile material cut-off is
now. It offers the best hope to limit the
upward spiral in warhead numbers. Instead
of threatening to create more Kahutas,
Pakistan should offer to stop production
of highly enriched uranium while India
should respond by ceasing to reprocess its
reactor wastes. Previous stockpiles possessed
by either country should not be
brought into issue because their credible
verification is extremely difficult and would
inevitably derail an agreement. Years of
negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva came to naught for this
very reason. A series of “nuclear risk
reduction” talks between Pakistan and India
have also produced zero results. The cessation
of fissile material production is
completely absent from the agenda; it must
be made a central item now.

If a Pakistan-India bilateral agreement
could somehow come through, it would
have fantastically positive effects elsewhere.
China – which is the major target of US
nuclear weapons – may not have enough
warheads to match the US but has more than
a sufficient number to constitute a nuclear
deterrent. Inspired by an Indian cut-off, it
could declare a moratorium on fissile
material production. The US, which no longer
produces fissile materials because it has
a huge excess, could encourage the Chinese
action by offering to suspend work on its
Nuclear Missile Defence system.

Unfortunately, the US is not acting as
a force for peace in south Asia. Confronted
by the accusation that it is pumping arms
into a region that some of its leaders had
once described as a “nuclear tinder box”,
US officials have responded defensively
with answers such as: you have to deal with
the world as it is and the Indian programme
cannot be rolled back; India is a democracy;
India needs to import nuclear fuel
and technology and we need to sell them.
But such replies sweep under the carpet
the disturbing history of near-nuclear
conflict on the subcontinent for which the
US has often taken credit for defusing.
By proceeding with the nuclear deal with
India the US may destabilise south Asia.
Equally, if it forces a change in the global
nuclear order by creating an exception for
India, it will have bartered away one of
its fundamental interests. “What will Russia
say when they want to supply more nuclear
materials or technology to Iran?” angrily
asked congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts.
Indeed, the US-India nuclear deal
will deeply damage the NPT, take the heat
off Iran and North Korea, open the door
for Japan to convert its plutonium stocks
into bombs, and create the conditions for
eventual global nuclear anarchy.


Email: pervezhoodbhoy@yahoo.com

17 November 2007

Information on US nuclear weapons

WASHINGTON EXPANDS ITS ILLEGAL WMD ARSENAL

BY DOUG LORIMER

While preaching "non-proliferation" of weapons of mass destruction to underdeveloped countries -- and using allegations of WMD development as a justification for invading Iraq and threatening to attack North Korea, Iran and Syria -- the United States is pushing ahead with the development of banned biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

n violation of the 1972 international Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), the US Army was granted a patent on February 25 for a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) that can deliver "biological agents".

While US federal laws, written to enforce the BTWC, make it a crime to "knowingly develop" a "delivery system for use as a weapon" that contains "biological agents", the US Army applied for and received a patent to produce an RPG that can release aerosols

"consisting of smoke, crowd-control agents, biological agents, chemical agents, obscurants, marking agents, dyes and inks, chaffs and flakes".

That same month, US war secretary Donald Rumsfeld argued before the US House of Representatives' armed services committee that the US military should be permitted to use "non-lethal" chemical agents.

Under the rules of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which became international law in 1997 and to which the US is a signatory, "any chemical which through its ... action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacition or permanent harm to humans or animals" is forbidden as a method of warfare.

Rumsfeld referred to the CWC as a "straitjacket" limiting US options in war.

Last September, the Sunshine Project, a non-government organisation that monitors biological weapons programs, obtained documents from the Pentagon's Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) revealing that the US military was operating a secret chemical weapons research program.

In violation of the CWC, this program is developing military delivery systems for chemical agents, including an 81-millimetre mortar round, with a range of 2.5 kilometres. The JNLWD documents stated that the chemical weapons are intended to be used against "terrorists" and "potentially hostile civilians".

The Pentagon claims its chemical and biological weapons programs are not in violation of the CWC and BTWC because the weapons under development are "non-lethal". Last October's three-day Moscow theatre siege was ended with the use of a "non-lethal" chemical agent fed into the building through the air conditioning system by Russian special forces troops. The knock-out gas killed 129 of the 800 hostages.

Deceptive language

Deceptive language is also being used to hide Washington's drive to develop new nuclear weapons. On May 20-21, both houses of the US Congress voted to ditch a 10-year congressional ban on researching "low-yield" nuclear devices with an explosive capacity of 5 kilotons of TNT or less.

Buried in the US$399.1 billion military budget for fiscal year 2004 -- consisting of $379.9 billion for the Pentagon and $19.3 billion for the nuclear weapons programs run by the Department of Energy -- is authorisation for the DoE to research and test small nuclear weapons and the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator". The RNEF is a "bunker-buster" nuclear weapon said to be at least 10 times more destructive than the 15-kiloton nuclear bomb dropped by the US on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, killing 200,000 people. [This has been reported in the Russian press and the arabic press, but NOT the North American press, following the "testing" - read saber rattling of Russia -- of the vacuum bomb. Threats were MADE.]

Development of these new nuclear weapons will violate the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. To get around this, Washington is claiming thatit is not developing new nuclear weapons, just "modifying" existing ones.

The US arsenal already contains a nuclear "earth penetrator" -- known as the B61-11 -- but it can only penetrate dry earth to a depth of about 7 metres. The purpose of the RNEP is to penetrate concrete or rock. Its supposed targets would be underground "command centres". But it could also be used to obliterate civilians who may have taken refuge in a underground air-raid shelters or subway systems in a large city.

Such an atrocity was committed by Washington during its first war against Iraq in 1991, when two US missiles made direct hits on the underground Amiriya air-raid shelter in Baghdad, incinerating more than 1000 civilians. The Pentagon at first claimed it had targeted a "command post". Only after the international media showed crowds of grieving relatives and burned corpses being removed from the shelter did the Pentagon acknowledge the real nature of its target. If the shelter had been hit by an RNEF -- a full-scale hydrogen bomb -- their would have been no burned corpses to retrieve since the shelter and its occupants would have been vaporised.

Battlefield nuclear weapons

The development of these new nuclear weapons is integral to the Bush administration's plans to increase its arsenal of "tactical" battlefield nuclear weapons. These plans were made public in March last year, when some of the Pentagon's classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) documents -- delivered to Congress on January 8, 2002 -- were obtained by the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times.

The NPR reaffirmed long-standing US policy of being prepared to use nuclear weapons in a military conflict with countries either not possessing nuclear weapons or not having used them -- a policy first implemented against Japan in 1945, and now publicly known to have been threatened on at least 16 occasions since then, including during the Korean War, at the end of the 1946-54 French colonial war in Vietnam, during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and during 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

According to the March 12, 2002, New York Times, the NPR "proposes lowering the overall number of nuclear weapons, but widening the circumstances thought to justify a possible nuclear response". The first half of this assessment was highly misleading.

According to the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), set up and run by retired military officers, the US had a total of 6480 operationally deployed "strategic" nuclear warheads in 2002 -- 1700 on 550 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 3120 on 432 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 1660 on 118 long-range bombers.

In addition, the US had a stockpile of 2166 "spare" and "inactive" warheads -- warheads that still have their fissionable plutonium detonators but do not have fusionable hydrogen gas installed.

The NPR set a goal of reducing the number of "operationally deployed" "strategic" US nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 within 10 years. However, the NPR also set a goal of retaining a "responsive force" of warheads that can be redeployed "in weeks".

As a result, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in Moscow by US President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in May 2002 -- which committed both countries to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by two-thirds by 2012 -- did not include a requirement, originally sought by the Russians, for the destruction of warheads removed from the "operationally deployed" category.

According to the CDI, the "responsive force" will include 1350 strategic warheads in operational condition. The operationally deployed arsenal will be reduced by 2012 to 2200 warheads, plus 240 in "overhaul". The "spare" and "inactive" stockpile will increase to 4180, giving the US a total "strategic" arsenal of 7970.

Furthermore, according to the National Resources Defense Council (the largest US environmental organisation), the US also maintains some 5000 stored plutonium "primary" and highly enriched uranium "secondary" components that could be reassembled into nuclear warheads. Thus by 2012, the US will retain the ability to deploy around 13,000 "strategic" nuclear warheads -- not much less than it now has!

Wider range of targets

In addition, the US currently has an arsenal of some 2000 "tactical" nuclear weapons, consisting of warheads mounted on sea-launched cruise missiles and free-fall bombs carried by US Air Force jet fighters and battlefield attack aircraft, which are not covered by any international arms treaties.

The NPR proposed a wider range of uses of nuclear weapons, including

"against targets able to withstand a non-nuclear attack" and "in the event of surprising military developments".
Hence the Pentagon's push to expand its "tactical" nuclear weapons arsenal through the development of the RNEP and "mini-nukes".

The NPR, noting that existing US nuclear weapons facilities are capable of refurbishing "roughly 350 weapons per year", called for the construction of

"a new modern production facility ... to deal with the large-scale replacement of components and new production".
Commenting on the decision of the US Senate's armed services committee to recommend the repealing of the 1993 congressional ban on the development of small nuclear weapons, Richard Butler, former chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq in the 1990s, told the May 14 SBS television's Dateline program:
"The Bush administration wants to have nuclear weapons in the regular battlefield arsenal of its armed forces in order to use them in the same way that they'd use a conventional artillery shell piece, a conventional missile, an ordinary cannon...

"This administration in Washington is honestly asking other human beings to believe that American security is so precious that it can have in its possession whatever weapons of mass destruction it might want, but others can't."
This attitude, however, is not unique to the Bush administration. Since they used the first nuclear bombs in 1945, the US imperialist rulers have always sought to ensure that they maintain a relative monopoly of "usable"weapons of mass destruction in order to blackmail rebellious nations.

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16 November 2007

RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS AND THEIR CONTROL

http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/armytm/tm5-801-10/app-b.pdf

B- I. Types of ionizing radiation
penetrating than either alpha or beta radiation and may be
At any facility which produces, processes, uses, or stores
radioactive materials, radiological hazards will be present
to some degree. The basic hazard associated with radioactive
material is the emission of ionizing radiation.
Radioactive material, whether naturally occurring or
manmade, is unstable and is constantly seeking a stable,
atomic configuration through a process called radioactive
decay. As radioactive material decays to stable,
nonradioactive material, or to other types of radioactive
material, ionizing radiation is emitted. This ionizing
radiation will be emitted in either particle or
electromagnetic waveform. The four basic types of
radiation of concern are alpha radiation (particles), beta
radiation (particles), gamma radiation (electromagnetic
waves), and neutron radiation (particles).
a. Alpha Radiation. Alpha radiation is composed of
positively charged particles. Each particle is composed of
two neutrons and two protons, making an alpha particle
identical to the nucleus of a helium atom (24He). Alpha
radiation is less penetrating than either beta or gamma
radiation and may be completely stopped by a sheet of
paper. Alpha radiation is not a hazard external to the
body but becomes a hazard if the alpha-emitting
radioactive material gets inside the body. Alpha radiation
is denoted by the Greek letter a.
b. Beta Radiation. Beta radiation is composed of
negatively charged particles. Each particle is identical to
an electron (-10e). Beta radiation is more penetrating than
alpha but less penetrating than gamma radiation and may
be completely stopped by a thin sheet of metal such as
aluminum. Beta radiation is an external hazard to the skin
of the body and to the eyes, and is also an internal hazard
if the beta-emitting radioactive material gets inside the
body. Beta radiation is denoted by the Greek letter $.
c. Gamma Radiation. Gamma radiation is high energy,
short wavelength electromagnetic radiation, frequently
accompanying alpha and beta radiation. Gamma radiation
is much more penetrating than either alpha or beta radiation
because of its wave form. Gamma is similar in form
and energy to K-radiation. Gamma radiation is not
entirely stopped by materials but can be almost
completely attenuated by dense materials like lead or
depleted uranium, and with greater thicknesses of
materials such as water or concrete. Because of its
penetrating power, gamma radiation is a hazard to the
entire body, whether or not the gamma emitting
radioactive material is inside or outside the body. Gamma
radiation is denoted by the Greek letter
d. Neutron Radiation. Neutron radiation is composed
of particles with no electrical charge (10n). Neutron radiation
is less penetrating than gamma radiation, but more penetrating
than either alpha or beta radiation and may be
completely stopped by an appropriate thickness of a
hydrogenous material like water or concrete. Neutron
radiation has the unique property of being able to convert
nonradioactive material to radioactive material. Neutrons
are external hazards. They are emitted by machines such
as nuclear reactors. They could be an internal hazard if a
source emitting neutrons enter the body. Neutron
radiation is denoted by the small English letter n.

B-2. Types of radiological hazards
The radiations described above are hazards because each
has the ability to ionize, either directly or indirectly, cells
which make up body organs and structures. This exposure
can be either internal or external. If the body is exposed
to large doses of ionizing radiation, cell damage may be
sufficient to interfere with normal body functions and can
cause undesirable biological effects, both in the
individuals exposed and in the future offspring of these
individuals. During the decommissioning process,
radiological hazards may be present in the form of
radiation only, or in the form of radiation together with
the radioactive material emitting the radiation. These
hazards may be grouped as external radiation, surface
radioactive contamination, airborne radioactive
contamination and waterborne radioactive contamination.
a. External Radiation.
External radiation hazards to
an individual are those presented by exposure to
emissions from radioactive sources and contaminants that
are external to the person. External radiation can be
emitted from contained or partially contained sources.
Examples include sealed radioactive sources and
radioactive material contained in a closure such as a pipe,
equipment, or a system component of some type. External
radiation hazards may also be posed by surface
contamination, airborne contamination, or waterborne
contamination. Radiation dose to individuals must be
measured to show compliance with regulatory limits. This
measurement is accomplished by film badges,
thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). direct-reading
dosimeters, or a combination of the three. Radiation dose
rates are measured by portable and fixed instruments to
quantify the external radiation hazard. Individuals may be
protected from external radiation, or at least have their
radiation dose minimized, by three methods: time,
distance, and shielding.
(1) Time. Minimizing time spent in areas where external
radiation is present minimizes radiation dose.
(2) Distance. The greater the distance from a source
of radiation, the less the dose rate.
(3) Shielding. Installing materials such as lead or
concrete around a source of radiation will reduce the dose
rate.

b. Surface Radioactive Contamination.
c. Airborne Radioactive Contamination.
d. Waterborne Radioactive Contamination.

For more, see the link. This is all related to
FUSION radiation (think it's safe NOW???)

DIapers as radiation carriers: Canada

Capital Health moves to catch radioactive waste in hospitals

By FRANK LANDRY, CITY HALL BUREAU

Capital Health is considering installing high-tech sensors in its hospitals to catch radioactive waste before it's hauled off to the city dump.

Rob Stevenson, a spokesman for the health authority, told Sun Media that sensors at the Edmonton Waste Management Centre have detected radioactive material in Capital Health waste 15 to 20 times this year alone.

"We're working very hard with the city on this because of course it's a concern," he said.

All vehicles entering the dump must pass through radiation sensors. In the case of Capital Health, the alarms were set off by soiled diapers.

Stevenson said the garments contained urine with trace amounts of nuclear isotopes, which would have entered a patient's system while undergoing diagnostic testing, like PET scans.

Typically, Stevenson said Capital Health holds on to diapers for four days - enough time for the short-lived "nuclear garbage" to disintergrate.

He acknowledged sometimes there can be mix-ups, particularly when a patient is transferred between wards, and the diapers can wind up in the garbage too early.

When the sensors at the Edmonton Waste Management Centre were activated, Stevenson said Capital Health was contacted.

"It becomes a big hassle because then we send someone from our nuclear medicine department up to talk with them and figure it out."

The offending waste is then held by Capital Health for four days, before being returned to the dump, he said.

The low level of radiation is generally not considered to be much of a risk. (????)

One solution, Stevenson said, is installing radioactive waste sensors at all waste facilities inside hospitals.