Showing posts with label DOE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DOE. Show all posts

02 June 2011

NRC ACRS transcript on Fukushima review publicly available

On May 26th, Kevin Kamps of Beyond Nuclear attended the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Fukushima subcommittee meeting, held at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. The ACRS allowed representatives from the Nuclear Energy Institute and the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy -- both nuclear power proponents -- to speak for an hour and a half each.

Nuclear engineer Arnold Gundersen of Fairewinds Associates, a skeptic of the industry, former whistleblower, and expert witness in environmental campaigns against dangerous old and proposed new reactors, was only granted five minutes (and was continually interrupted by extraneous noise on the ACRS phone system).

However, the transcript is now available.

The DOE presentation, from page 78 to 145, contains many revelations about the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe that have not yet been publicly reported. The DOE spokesman's 40 powerpoint slides are also included towards the end of the transcript, as is Arnold Gundersen's written testimony.

During a very brief, previously unannounced opportunity for public comments at the end of the ACRS meeting, Kevin announced Beyond Nuclear's emergency enforcement petition to NRC -- supported by a growing number of anti-nuclear watchdog groups who live in the shadows of the 24 U.S. General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Mark 1s and their high-level radioactive waste storage pools, which are identical or very similar in design to Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 to 4.

An NRC Petition Review Board will hear Beyond Nuclear's testimony, as well as that of its growing coalition of grassroots environmental allies, calling for the immediate suspension of GE BWR Mark 1 operating licenses, as well as for emergency back up power to be required on high-level radioactive waste storage pools, on June 8th.

DateJune 1, 2011

ANS well to test methane hydrate technologies

May 18, 2011
Nick Snow
OGJ Washington Editor
 
WASHINGTON, DC, May 18 -- A fully instrumented well that will test innovative technologies to produce methane gas from hydrate deposits has been safely installed on Alaska’s North Slope and will be available for field experiments as early as next winter, the US Department of Energy’s Fossil Energy Office announced on May 17.

FEO said the well—the result of a partnership of ConocoPhillips and FEO’s National Energy Technology Laboratory—will test a technology that involves injecting carbon dioxide into sandstone reservoirs containing methane hydrate. Laboratory studies indicate that the CO2 molecules will replace the methane molecules in the solid hydrate lattice, resulting in the simultaneous sequestration of CO2 in a solid hydrate structure and production of methane gas, FEO said.

Recently completed operations include the acquisition of a research-level suite of measurements through the subpermafrost hydrate-bearing sediments, it indicated. The data confirm the occurrence of 160 ft of gas-hydrate-bearing sand reservoirs in four separate zones, as predicted, and provide insight into their physical and mechanical properties.

An array of downhole pressure-temperature gauges were installed in the well, as well as a continuous fiber-optic temperature sensor outside the well casing, which will monitor the well as it returns to natural conditions following the drilling program, FEO added.

It said in coming months, field trial participants will review the data to determine the optimal parameters for future field testing. Current plans are to reenter the well in a future winter drilling season, and conduct a 1-2 month program of CO2 injection and well production to assess the efficiency of the exchange process.
Following those tests, the remaining time available before the spring thaw (as much as 40 days) may be used to test reservoir response to pressure reduction in the wellbore. This alternative methane-production method, "depressurization," recently proved effective during short-term testing conducted by the governments of Japan and Canada at a site in northwestern Canada, according to FEO.

03 May 2011

America’s Nuclear Nightmare: Rolling Stone magazine

America’s Nuclear Nightmare

The U.S. has 31 reactors just like Japan’s — but regulators are ignoring the risks and boosting industry profits


The Davis-Besse nuclear generating station in Ohio, 
where a football-size hole overlooked by NRC 
inspectors nearly caused a catastrophe in 2002

Energy Nuclear via the NRC
By Jeff Goodell
April 27, 2011 9:00 AM ET
The meltdown in Japan couldn't have happened at a worse time for the industry. In recent years, nuclear power has been hyped as the only energy source that could replace coal quickly enough to slow the pace of global warming. Some 60 new nukes are currently in the works worldwide, prompting the industry to boast of a "nuclear renaissance." In his 2012 budget, President Obama included $54 billion in federal loan guarantees for new reactors — far more than the $18 billion available for renewable energy.
Without such taxpayer support, no new reactors would ever be built. Since the Manhattan Project was created to develop the atomic bomb back in the 1940s, the dream of a nuclear future has been fueled almost entirely by Big Government. America's current fleet of reactors exists only because Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in 1957, limiting the liability of nuclear plant operators in case of disaster. And even with taxpayers assuming most of the risk, Wall Street still won't finance nuclear reactors without direct federal assistance, in part because construction costs are so high (up to $20 billion per plant) and in part because nukes are the only energy investment that can be rendered worthless in a matter of hours. "In a free market, where real risks and costs are accounted for, nuclear power doesn't exist," says Amory Lovins, a leading energy expert at the Rocky Mountain Institute. Nuclear plants "are a creation of government policy and intervention."
They are also a creation of lobbying and campaign contributions. Over the past decade, the nuclear industry has contributed more than $4.6 million to members of Congress — and last year alone, it spent $1.7 million on federal lobbying. Given the generous flow of nuclear money, the NRC is essentially rigged to operate in the industry's favor. The agency has plenty of skilled engineers and scientists at the staff level, but the five commissioners who oversee it often have close ties to the industry they are supposed to regulate. "They are vetted by the industry," says Robert Alvarez, a former senior policy adviser at the Energy Department. "It's the typical revolving-door story — many are coming in or out of jobs with the nuclear power industry. You don't get a lot of skeptics appointed to this job."
Jeffrey Merrifield, a former NRC commissioner who left the agency in 2007, is a case in point. When Merrifield was ready to exit public service, he simply called up the CEO of Exelon, the country's largest nuclear operator, and asked him for a job recommendation. Given his friends in high places, he wound up taking a top job at the Shaw Group, a construction firm that builds nuclear reactors — and he's done his best to return the favor. During the Fukushima disaster, Merrifield appeared on Fox News, as well as in videos for the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's lobbying group. In one video — titled "Former NRC Commissioner Confident That Building of New U.S. Nuclear Plants Should Continue" — Merrifield reassures viewers that the meltdown in Japan is no big deal. "We should continue to move forward with building those new plants," he says, "because it's the right thing for our nation and it's the right thing for our future."
Such cozy relationships between regulators and the industry are nothing new. The NRC and the utilities it oversees have engaged in an unholy alliance since 1974, when the agency rose from the ashes of the old Atomic Energy Commission, whose mandate was to promote nuclear power. "For political reasons, the U.S. wanted to show something good could come out of splitting the atom," says Robert Duffy, a political scientist at Colorado State University who has written widely about the history of nuclear power. "There was great pressure on the industry to get nuclear plants built quickly." With no effective oversight by the government, the industry repeatedly cut corners on the design and construction of reactors. At the Diablo Canyon plant in California, engineers actually installed vital cooling pipes backward, only to have to tear them out and reinstall them.
But even the lax oversight provided by the NRC was more than the industry could bear. In 1996, in one of the most aggressive enforcement moves in the agency's history, the NRC launched an investigation into design flaws at a host of reactors and handed out significant fines. When the industry complained to Sen. Pete Domenici of New Mexico, a powerful nuclear ally, he confronted the head of the NRC in his office and threatened to cut its funding by a third unless the agency backed off. "So the NRC folded their tent and went away," says Lochbaum. "And they've been away pretty much ever since."
The Japanese disaster should have been a wake-up call for boosters of nuclear power. America has 31 aging reactors just like Fukushima, and it wouldn't take an earthquake or tsunami to push many of them to the brink of meltdown. A natural disaster may have triggered the crisis in Japan, but the real problem was that the plant lost power and was unable to keep its cooling systems running — a condition known as "station blackout." At U.S. reactors, power failures have been caused by culprits as mundane as squirrels playing on power lines. In the event of a blackout, operators have only a few hours to restore power before a meltdown begins. All nukes are equipped with backup diesel generators, as well as batteries. But at Fukushima, the diesel generators were swamped by floodwaters, and the batteries lasted a mere eight hours — not nearly long enough to get power restored and avert catastrophe. NRC standards do virtually nothing to prevent such a crisis here at home. Only 11 of America's nuclear reactors have batteries designed to supply power for up to eight hours, while the other 93 have batteries that last half that long.
And that's just the beginning of the danger. Aging reactors are a gold mine for the power companies that own them. Nuclear plants are expensive to build but cheap to operate, meaning the longer they run, the more profitable they become. The NRC has done its part to boost profitability by allowing companies to "uprate" old nukes — modifying them to run harder — without requiring additional safety improvements. Vermont Yankee, for example, was permitted to boost its output by 20 percent, eroding the reactor's ability to cool itself in the event of an emergency. The NRC's own advisory committee on reactor safety was vehemently opposed to allowing such modifications, but the agency ultimately allowed the industry to trade safety for profit. "The NRC put millions of Americans at elevated risk," says Lochbaum.

 FOR THE REST, Push the link.  This should have been written YEARS ago !

30 March 2011

Three Mile Island Haunts US Nuclear Policy


32 Years Later, Industry Still Recovering From Its Worst US Nuclear Disaster

At about dawn on March 28, 1979, Pete Velez was cruising through Middletown, Pa., past the Blue Room saloon where some of the guys from work drank after their shifts.
Velez was headed to work at Three Mile Island nuclear plant, where four 370-foot cooling towers stood proudly over the countryside, signs of a new age of technological progress, according to the 1982 book "The Warning -- Accident At Three Mile Island," by Mike Gray and Ira Rosen, an inside account of America's worst nuclear accident.
The book describes how Velez arrived to find cars backed up and figured it must be a security issue -- maybe someone left a door open. He chatted with the gate guard.
"What's the matter, you lose somebody?" Velez smiled.
"No."
"Well, what's going on?"
"Radiation emergency."
"A drill? At 6 o'clock in the morning?"
"It's no drill."
As radiation-protection foreman, Valez's job was to make sure no one was unnecessarily exposed. Fueled by adrenaline, he raced up stairs to the Unit Two control room and threw open the door to startling chaos. Packs of engineers, technicians and plant managers were huddled in the cavernous room, all talking over each other. The 90-foot long arching wall of lights and gauges, along with a shorter console that followed the same arc, were lit up like Christmas trees. Radiation alarms went off one after another, jangling the nerves of the trouble-shooters.
Velez carried a little green notebook for scribbling notes about anything that he thought might be important. At that moment he simply wrote, "Aw [expletive]."
It's been more than three decades since the worst nuclear plant crisis in the nation's history, and U.S. nuclear plants have boasted a mostly spotless safety record since then. But anxiety over radiation leaks at the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan have have again renewed fear over nuclear plant safety.
Ultimately, it was deemed that the Three Mile Island accident was caused by faulty equipment and bad decisions made amid chaos -- "a combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures," as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission summed it up.
Investigations and cleanup revealed that the core of the plant partially melted down, unbeknownst to the harried officials working feverishly inside the plant at the time. The plant was dangerously close to a total meltdown -- a full-scale national disaster.
Remarkably, most of the radioactivity released by the partial meltdown was contained inside the plant and it resulted in no long-term health effects or environmental damage, most experts agree.
But five days of panic in Pennsylvania left lasting legacies. Three Mile Island became synonymous with nuclear catastrophe, stoked public fear of nuclear power, led to an overhaul of plant safety rules and effectively drained the steam from an entire industry – no new nuclear plants were ordered for 28 years.
Three Mile Island "remains the single most important event in the fifty-year history of nuclear power regulation in the United States," leading Three Mile Island expert J. Samuel Walker, says in his 2004 book "Three Mile Island – A Nuclear Crisis In Historical Perspective."

What Went Wrong

Nuclear power plants generate energy by boiling water into steam that turns turbines, which produce electricity. To generate steam, nuclear plants use heat from fission – the splitting of atoms of uranium fuel. More than 36,000 zirconium alloy rods packed with about 100 tons of uranium pellets were bundled and placed inside the reactor core.
The chaos that Velez found when he arrived at work was set in motion inside Unit Two at about 4 a.m.
Media reports and books that chronicle the inside story of the crisis – including reports by PBS, in the Washington Post and the books by Walker, Gray and Rosen, and "TMI: 25 Years Later" by Bonnie Osif, Anthony Baratta and Thomas Conkling -- explain how it unfolded.
Pumps that move water through the reactor failed, prompting the plant's massive steam-powered turbines and the reactor itself to shut down.
When heat and pressure inside the reactor increased, a relief valve popped open. But the valve malfunctioned and did not automatically close when the pressure decreased.
Cooling water flowed out of the valve, and that led to partial meltdown – the zirconium rods failed and uranium pellets melted, releasing highly radioactive vapor, some of which was vented into the atmosphere in the following hours.

Communications Fail Amid Chaos

Plant managers and technicians tried to diagnose the fast-multiplying problems as instruments showed conflicting information about the temperature and pressure in the core. Radiation meters started clicking and officials at times were awkwardly communicating through respirators. They missed clues that would have tipped them to the source of the trouble. They made mistakes that made problems worse.
It wasn't until late in the day that plant officials circulated enough water through the reactor that it covered the melting core that had been exposed for hours. The temperature began to decrease.
But public fear was growing fast as officials tried to regain control of the plant. By March 30, concern was spiking about the radiation that had been leaked into the atmosphere. Panic spread as scientists fretted over a hydrogen bubble that built up inside the reactor, which officials initially were worried could burn or explode.
Communications broke down. Politicians, health officials, federal bureaucrats, plant officials and executives with Babcock and Wilcox, which designed the plant, initially did not have their stories straight, which fed public anxiety.
Solid information was scarce. Increasingly hostile journalists couldn't get straight answers.
In the early hours, it was hard for officials outside the plant to get a direct phone line to the control room. Even President Jimmy Carter couldn't get through and ordered that direct lines be established.
"There was just the most bizarre flow and lack of information," Susan Stranahan, who was part of a Philadelphia Inquirer team that won a Pulitzer Prize for its Three Mile Island coverage, said at a 20-year anniversary event.

'The China Syndrome'

Public fear was further stoked by a bizarre coincidence. The movie "The China Syndrome," the fictional story of a nuclear plant accident cover-up starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon, had been released just 12 days before the Three Mile Island incident. The title is a reference to the suggestion that if a nuclear plant core ever melted down it would burn a hole through the Earth all the way to China. In the movie, a scientist says that a meltdown would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. In combination with the real-life drama, the film became a blockbuster.
This crisis was an early test for Pennsylvania's Republican Gov. Richard Thornburgh, who had been on the job just 68 days, he has recalled in media interviews.
"The minute I heard that there had been an accident at a nuclear facility, I knew we were in another dimension," Thornburgh told PBS for a 1999 special on Three Mile Island.
The governor quickly grew frustrated with conflicting information from officials at the plant, its owner Metropolitan Edison, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The following day, Thornburgh ordered the evacuation of pregnant women and preschool-age children within a five-mile radius. About 140,000 fled.
Carter watched developments closely. The president was a nuclear engineer and understood the potential danger. On April 1, Carter and his wife Rosalynn went to the plant to help restore calm. The visit was brief but eased public fear and marked the end of the immediate crisis.

Health, Environmental Effects

Unit Two never operated again. It had cost about $700 million to construct but was open just three months. Cleanup, which continued until 1993, cost about $1 billion, the New York Times reported. The reactor's two cooling towers stand quiet to this day, in contrast to the two steam-belching Unit One towers.
Operations of the Unit One reactor were halted after the meltdown but restarted in 1985. The NRC is considering relicensing it through 2034.
It is generally agreed that the radiation released by Unit Two caused no lasting harm.
According to the NRC, among the agencies that did detailed studies of the radiological effects of the meltdown were the NRC, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, and the state of Pennsylvania. Studies suggest that the average radiation dose to about 2 million people in the area was only about 1 millirem -- a safe dose, according to the NRC. A chest X-ray delivers about 6 millirem.
Among the recent follow-up studies was a University of Pittsburgh study of 32,100 people who lived within five miles of the plant. It found no significant difference in the rate of cancer deaths compared to the general population, the New York Times reported.
The NRC also says that investigators believe the environment was not damaged. The agency says that thousands of samples of air, water, milk, vegetation, soil and food were collected in the months following the meltdown and only "very low" levels of radionuclides were attributed to the plant.

Three Mile Island's Legacy

Nuclear power in its early days was hailed as a brilliant, futuristic answer to the nation's energy woes. The plants would produce power that was "too cheap to meter" with no greenhouse gases, industry advocates claimed.
But Three Mile Island left a legacy of public skepticism and fear that lingers a generation later. Industry advocates say that anxiety had largely faded -- at least until the disaster in Japan -- but the crisis at Three Mile Island dramatically altered the way Americans think about nuclear energy.
Three Mile Island effectively halted the advance of nuclear power in the energy-hungry U.S. In the wake of the crisis, plans that were under way for 74 new plants were canceled, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists. Since 1979, a number of plants have been decommissioned and no new plants were ordered for nearly a generation.
Today, 104 aging U.S. reactors produce about 20 percent of the nation's energy. In recent years, amid a race to develop "clean" energy and reduce oil dependence, nuclear power has enjoyed a renaissance, with powerful lawmakers singing its praises. In the last two years, nuclear utilities have filed license applications with the NRC to construct up to 26 new plants, although it would take years for the new reactors to be approved and constructed.
Proponents note that, unlike coal plants, nuclear power produces no greenhouse gases. They cite an excellent safety record since 1979. New plants also generate jobs, advocates say.
But the industry still faces obstacles, including heightened fears about safety renewed by the disaster in Japan.
The industry also is mired in a long-standing toxic debate over waste storage. Because it's extremely expensive to build nuclear plants, economic forces also remain a hurdle to industry expansion.
So does the ghost of Unit Two.
"Three Mile Island was almost 30 years ago, so perhaps the industry and the NRC have forgotten about it," Dave Lochbaum, a director at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said at a 29th anniversary event last year. "But you can bet that even the people who welcome new plants in their communities will want to know if what happened at Three Mile Island could happen to them. As of right now, the industry and the NRC haven't done enough to ensure them it won't."

02 November 2007

Surplus Plutonium to be Consolidated in South Carolina??

Surplus Plutonium to Be Consolidated in South Carolina

WASHINGTON, DC, September 6, 2007 (ENS) - The U.S. Department of Energy, DOE, says it will consolidate surplus radioactive plutonium at its Savannah River Site, a 310-square-mile complex bordering the Savannah River between South Carolina and Georgia. The facility is one of several that manages the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear materials.

Starting in 30 days, the agency will move some 3,000 plutonium storage containers across the country to their new location, a process that will not be finished until 2010.

The plutonium will come from the Hanford Site in Washington state, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.

"Consolidation is a key part of the department's efforts to properly manage surplus plutonium and follows our dedication to non-proliferation, environmental management and national security," said Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management James Rispoli announcing the move on Wednesday.

"Today's decision continues the momentum for the safe disposition of surplus materials," he said.

Some 2,300 plutonium storage containers from Hanford and close to 700 from Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos Labs will be transported to the Savannah River Site.

The agency said moving the plutonium to Savannah River would reduce the number of sites holding special nuclear material, "enhancing the security of these materials and reducing the costs associated with plutonium storage, surveillance and monitoring, and security at multiple sites."

Only non-pit plutonium will be shipped, that is plutonium which comes from sources other than nuclear weapons triggers, or pits.

Once the material is at the Savannah River Site, the department plans to make mixed oxide, MOX, fuel by mixing plutonium and uranium oxides to use in specially equipped nuclear power reactors.

The first U.S. MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility is currently under construction.

In another disposal plan, the agency says it will use the existing H-Canyon facility, so called because of the long, narrow shape of the building in which chemical separations of radioactive materials takes place.

H Canyon provides a path for recycling the uranium into commercial nuclear power plant fuel in lieu of planned disposal at a federal geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, which is stalled in budgetary and political conflict.

A third plan is to immobilize some of the surplus plutoniuim in a proposed new, small-scale plutonium vitrification plant that would encase it in glass.

"DOE will evaluate reducing and possibly eliminating the need for the vitrification capability, and instead disposing of all the surplus plutonium through the MOX facility and H-Canyon," the agency said today.

The citizens group Nuclear Watch South says it "acknowledges the urgent need to provide security for plutonium" but opposes MOX manufacturing.

Coordinator Glenn Carroll warns that

"Transporting highly toxic plutonium - one-millionth of a gram can induce lung cancer in a human - risks the health of millions of citizens along transportation routes. No analysis of risk of terrorism for shipping plutonium has been done."

The MOX plutonium fuel program "is already nine years behind schedule" and the plutonium proposed to be shipped for storage to Savannah River Site is of similar quality to 12 tons of "orphan" plutonium already at the site that is unsuitable for conversion to MOX fuel, Carroll says, cautioning that the plutonium arriving at the site "is likely to add to the stockpile that has defied disposition to date."

"The plutonium 'disposition' program is in disarray," Carroll says, pointing out that MOX is dependent on 30 years of sustained Congressional support and Congress has displayed increasing discomfort with the MOX program, cancelling it completely for several months earlier this year.

Plutonium vitrification, also called immobilization, a process that encases the radioactive material in glass, is supported by Nuclear Watch South and other environmentalists, and the junk "orphan" plutonium is well suited to vitrification, says Carroll.

He notes that DOE's commitment to immobilization is weak.

"We recognize the unique infrastructure of Savannah River Site and abilities of its workforce to perform the mission of plutonium disposition via immobilization," said Carroll. "We oppose shipping the plutonium until DOE has reconciled the conflicts in its internal vision and created a solid plan for plutonium disposition."

The DOE says it has notified Congress and provided a plan for the disposal of the surplus plutonium once it gets to Savannah River, as required under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.

Consolidation of surplus plutonium at Savannah River has been analyzed in a Supplement Analysis and DOE issued an Amended Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. To see these documents, click here.

Separately from this consolidation announcement, the Energy Department is preparing a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the Savannah River Site to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of alternative methods of disposing of the surplus, non-pit plutonium materials.

Copyright Environment News Service (ENS) 2007. All rights res

25 October 2007

Ruling Allows Radioactive Metal in Household Products

Ruling Allows Radioactive Metal in Household Products

The result: 100,000 tons of radioactive metals to be sold as scrap metal for use in items ranging from frying pans to baby carriages, said Wenonah Hauter, director of Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project.
Swell. - M. R.

Ruling Allows Radioactive Metal in Household Products

A recent decision in a federal lawsuit will result in the continued recycling of thousands of tons of radioactive metal for use in household products. Because of a loophole in the Superfund cleanup law, a federal judge said she could not order the Department of Energy (DOE) to stop the practice by which nuclear materials are recycled and used in everyday consumer products. The nuclear industry, in cooperation with the federal government, has been attempting to "deregulate" radioactive metals from weapon facilities and decommissioned nuclear power plants since the 1970s. Public Citizen and other citizens' organizations have successfully prevented this practice prior to the ruling.

Plaintiffs in the lawsuit sought to force the DOE to conduct an environmental impact study of a $250 million DOE contract awarded in 1997 to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) to "recycle" radioactive metals from uranium enrichment plants in Tennessee. Such a study would have delayed and possibly prevented the reuse of the radioactive metal.

In a June 29 decision, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler used strong language about the danger this recycling poses to the public, but said she could not order the DOE to write an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), thanks to a Superfund loophole. The judge described as "startling and worrisome" the absence of opportunity for

"public scrutiny or input on a matter of such grave importance ... the potential for environmental harm is great, especially given the unprecedented amount of hazardous materials which the Defendants seek to recycle."

The result: 100,000 tons of radioactive metals to be sold as scrap metal for use in items ranging from frying pans to baby c
arriages, said Wenonah Hauter, director of Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project.

Public Citizen and other groups are urging Congress and Vice President Gore to halt the nuclear materials recylcing contract between DOE and BNFL.