Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts

29 June 2011

Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb - 'We May Be Naive, But We Are Not Idiots'


'We May Be Naive, But We Are Not Idiots'

The father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan: a 'conditional pardon'
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The father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan: a 'conditional pardon'
He built Pakistan's nuclear bomb and is accused of having sold his knowledge to Libya and Iran. Since 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan has been under a state of house arrest. In an e-mail interview, he now explains why he accepted sole blame for the accusations at the time and points a finger at the Pakistani army.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Recent attacks on a naval base in Karachi, Pakistan, which resulted in the deaths of 16 people, show that extremists are posing a serious threat to the government in Islamabad. How safe is the Pakistani nuclear arsenal?
Khan: This hype has been created by the West. There never was, there is not and there never will be any threat to our nuclear assets. Right from the early 1980s on, the army put a fully fail-safe mechanism in place, which was subsequently improved upon by successive army chiefs. The plant was always secured by a fully armed army contingent and the perimeters were made impregnable using various tiers. Since then the security of our nuclear assets has been taken care of by the National Command Authority which has put in place a system whereby decisions are to be taken by a number of people who also possess specific security codes. It would thus be impossible, even if there were an infiltration of extremists, to pass all the components of the security system and get to the bomb.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Nobody has been as active as you in the business of nuclear proliferation in problematic countries like Libya, Iran and North Korea. What drove you to do so? Was it money or the desire to help other Muslim countries build the bomb?
Khan: I did not indulge in proliferation and there is no such thing as an"A.Q. Khan Network."
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Excuse me?
Khan: International suppliers were willing to sell to anyone able to pay and they didn't need me for that. The suppliers to Libya and Iran were the same as the ones Khan Research Laboratories used. We had a contract with North Korea for the production of missiles. They already had their own plutonium production program and they used plutonium in their test procedures. Logistics and security at our plant was in the hands of the army and they checked each and every item that came in or left. How then could I have sent things to any country without the army's knowledge?
SPIEGEL ONLINE: So you are seriously trying to suggest that you never dealt in nuclear weapons or benefited financially from doing so?
Khan: No, no and again no. I did not benefit financially. If that had been the case, would the Special Plans Division, the army unit I worked with, now be paying me a monthly "special pension"?
SPIEGEL ONLINE: If nothing could be sent out of the country without the knowledge of the army, then who benefited from this major business? Certain officers?
Khan: Who benefited, I may not say.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Seven years ago, you publicly confessed to a television audience of millions that you sold nuclear technology out of greed for profit. You are retracting that statement today. Why?
Khan: I took sole blame for this whole episode because the political leadership urgently asked me to do so. General Pervez Musharraf promised me a full pardon with complete rehabilitation. However, within a few days the mischief started and he started talking of a "conditional pardon," the consequences of which we now all know. Our house was searched and bugged, our phones and Internet connection were disconnected.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: So you are saying you feel you were tricked?
Khan: Tricked is not the right word. I feel stabbed in the back by the very people who benefited most from my work -- i.e., the army.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Could a nuclear war between India and Pakistan ever even be won by either of the countries?
Khan: Pakistan was forced to go nuclear in response to the Indian tests and political aggression. The deterrence of nuclear weapons lies in the fact that both sides know that the other can retaliate in kind. Had Japan had nuclear weapons during World War II, the Americans never would have dared to use theirs. There has not been a war in Europe since 1945 …
SPIEGEL ONLINE: … other than the Balkan wars …
Khan: … and there has not been one between India and Pakistan since 1971. The Kargil skirmishes were localized and the issue of the use of nuclear weapons never arose. We may be naive, but we are not idiots. Both sides know what the consequences would be.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: If it did not have nuclear weapons, Pakistan would not currently be considered one of the world's most dangerous countries. Do you regret having built the bomb?
Khan: I still believe I did Pakistan a favor. Nuclear weapons are a means of ensuring peace by using it as a tit-for-tat threat. I am convinced that there will never be another war between India and Pakistan as a consequence thereof.
Interview conducted by Susanne Koelbl

06 January 2008

The Nuclear Walmart - youtube visuals

Start it at about 4:40 minutes as the first part is mostly local news and weather, if you want to save some time.

How nuclear proliferation was achieved ..

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/1/6/112413/4231/854/431373

I choose this version of the release, as it is fairly comprehensive.

The Daily Kos comments are EXCELLENT, and you might go to the link and check them out ..

Sibel Edmonds case: Front page of the (UK) papers (finally) Hotlist

Sun Jan 06, 2008 at 08:24:13 AM PST

There's a remarkable article For sale: West’s deadly nuclear secrets on the front page of the British Times today.

A WHISTLEBLOWER (Sibel Edmonds) has made a series of extraordinary claims about how corrupt government officials allowed Pakistan and other states to steal nuclear weapons secrets.
[...]
Edmonds described how foreign intelligence agents had enlisted the support of US officials to acquire a network of moles in sensitive military and nuclear institutions.

(Please note that the Times article is long, and I've tried to stay within the parameters of Fair Use. Please go read the whole thing)

From the article:

Edmonds described how foreign intelligence agents had enlisted the support of US officials to acquire a network of moles in sensitive military and nuclear institutions.

Among the hours of covert tape recordings, she says she heard evidence that one well-known senior official in the US State Department was being paid by Turkish agents in Washington who were selling the information on to black market buyers, including Pakistan.

The article doesn't name the official, but he is Marc Grossman, former #3 at the State Department, former ambassador to Turkey, and current Vice President at The Cohen Group, the lobbying company run by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen.

(Sibel) claims that the FBI was also gathering evidence against senior Pentagon officials – including household names – who were aiding foreign agents.

"If you made public all the information that the FBI have on this case, you will see very high-level people going through criminal trials," she said.

Those household names include Richard Perle and Douglas Feith and possibly Paul Wolfowitz. Less familiar names include Eric Edelman, Feith's replacement at the Pentagon, and former Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz.

(Sibel's) story shows just how much the West was infiltrated by foreign states seeking nuclear secrets. It illustrates how western government officials turned a blind eye to, or were even helping, countries such as Pakistan acquire bomb technology.

I'd quibble with this a little, Sibel has repeatedly said that her case involves criminal infiltration, not state-based espionage. As I wrote back in 2006:

"Sibel's case is about the systematic, long-term, for-profit, looting of US nuclear secrets (and who knows what else) by criminal organizations who then sell the nuclear technology to the highest bidder(s) - including terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.

To make matters worse, this has been taking place with the full knowledge of the US government."

Back to The Times:

The wider nuclear network has been monitored for many years by a joint Anglo-American intelligence effort. But rather than shut it down, investigations by law enforcement bodies such as the FBI and Britain’s Revenue & Customs have been aborted to preserve diplomatic relations.

Again, I'd quibble with the purported reason for why the investigations were shut down. It may be true that diplomatic relations were at stake, but it's also true that the people at the Pentagon and the State Dept who repeatedly shut down the investigations were also personally profiting from the whole enterprise, which may have (ahem) coloured their decision making process.

Here Sibel describes how investigations were shut down, despite the protestations of FBI agents (she also names Grossman here)

It's also important to note that they haven't specified which 'diplomatic relations' are at stake here. It's not just Pakistan. As Sibel said:

We don’t know what diplomatic relations they are referring to. They must be ashamed of it! They don’t want to mention it. So we have certain diplomatic relations that prevent criminals being prosecuted here. And I am talking about criminals in the United States of America.

The Times article then describes an FBI investigation into "links between the Turks and Pakistani, Israeli and US targets":

The Turks and Israelis had planted "moles" in military and academic institutions which handled nuclear technology. Edmonds says there were several transactions of nuclear material every month, with the Pakistanis being among the eventual buyers. "The network appeared to be obtaining information from every nuclear agency in the United States," she said.

They were helped, she says, by (Marc Grossman) who provided some of their moles – mainly PhD students – with security clearance to work in sensitive nuclear research facilities. These included the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory in New Mexico, which is responsible for the security of the US nuclear deterrent.
[...]
The Turks, she says, often acted as a conduit for the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s spy agency, because they were less likely to attract suspicion...

The article goes on to describe how the head of the ISI, General Mahmoud Ahmad, is a supporter of al-Qaeda, including partly financing the 911 terrorist attacks, and is also good friends with AQ Khan. Obviously the nuclear secrets stolen from the US fed directly into Pakistan's nuclear program, and also into Khan's proliferation network. The so-called 'AQ Khan network' provided the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea, Libya, and possibly up to a dozen other countries. Not only that, immediately prior to 911, Osama Bin Laden met with people in Khan's network with the aim of al-Qaeda acquiring nukes.

The article also describes how the ISI 'penetrated' the FBI translation unit in DC where Sibel worked, in much the same way that the Turkish network had placed moles there - enabling them to block important translations, steal incriminating documents, and recruit others to conduct espionage within the translation unit. Remarkably, this 'penetration' was not the result of remarkable sneakiness and superior spy-craft by the ISI and the Turkish networks - all evidence in both cases indicates that the penetration was condoned & enabled by senior people within the US government. Former FBI counterintelligence veteran John Cole (and others, including Sibel) describes the placement, despite his objections, of ISI operatives in the translation unit here.

The Times article then notes something that I reported 18 months ago. Immediately after 911, the FBI arrested a bunch of people suspected of being involved with the attacks - including four associates of key targets of FBI's counterintelligence operations. Sibel heard the targets tell Marc Grossman: "We need to get them out of the US because we can’t afford for them to spill the beans." Grossman duly facilitated their release from jail and the suspects immediately left the country without further investigation or interrogation.

Let me repeat that for emphasis: The #3 guy at the State Dept facilitated the immediate release of 911 suspects at the request of targets of the FBI's investigation.

Back to The Times:

Edmonds also claims that a number of senior officials in the Pentagon had helped Israeli and Turkish agents.

"The people provided lists of potential moles from Pentagon-related institutions who had access to databases concerning this information," she said.

"The handlers, who were part of the diplomatic community, would then try to recruit those people to become moles for the network. The lists contained all their ‘hooking points’, which could be financial or sexual pressure points, their exact job in the Pentagon and what stuff they had access to."

The article notes that Larry Franklin was one of those implicated in the scheme. However, Sibel has previously noted that Franklin was essentially a pawn in the system. More significant is the fact that high-level Pentagon officials were maintaining 'dossiers' on the sexual and financial proclivities of their underlings in order to be able to blackmail them.

I know that many of you have been (rightly) concerned about FISA, and many of you have (rightly) been confused by the inexplicable behaviour of Democrats in Congress, and wonder why they behave as though they are being blackmailed.

Now you know.

If any American journalists/media wants to step up, please remember that the nuclear black market story covered by The Times is just one element of Sibel's case.

Bradblog has more

Cross-posted at Let Sibel Edmonds Speak

(Email meif you want to be added to my Sibel email list. Subject: 'Sibel email list')

Tags: Sibel Edmonds, AQ Khan, Nuclear Proliferation, Marc Grossman, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Pakistan

19 November 2007

A little more on Economic and Political weekly; nuclear fantasie and more

Wish WE had a journal like this!!

THE HANDSTAND

DECEMBER 2005

The Invisible Intellectual

By Sudhanva Deshpande
ZNet Commentary
March 14, 2004


Unobtrusive, withdrawn, almost shy, he died as he lived: quietly, without fuss, in his sleep. Krishna Raj was responsible for creating, single-handedly, one of the most incredible intellectual institutions of our times, a journal called Economic and Political Weekly (EPW).

India boasts of one of the most vibrant democratic intellectual cultures anywhere in the world, even if the actual realization of political democracy on the ground remains imperfect, uneven, flawed, skewed, and currently - under the right wing dispensation that rules at the centre and in several states - under grave threat. The mark of this democratic intellectual culture is the vast variety of opinion that gets expressed in the media, and indeed in the very wide range of platforms that are available, in spite of growing corporatization of the media, for the thinking and concerned citizen to air his or her views.

While India has more than a dozen major languages - and each one of these languages has a robust intellectual and political culture - English is today undeniably the major language of intellectual discourse. And it is in English that we have four remarkable periodicals.

One is Mainstream, a magazine analysing current affairs, edited for long years by the late Nikhil Chakravartty. Then there is Seminar, a monthly devoted to debating a single problem from a variety of standpoints in each issue, edited by the husband-wife team of Raj and Romesh Thapar. Neither is alive today, but the journal continues publication with vigour. The youngest publication is Frontline, a newsmagazine edited by N. Ram.

While Mainstream has lost some of its sparkle after the death of its founder editor, Seminar, by its very nature, only commissions articles and caters to a somewhat shifting readership in each issue. Aijaz Ahmad, in the preface of his latest book 'Iraq, Afghanistan and the Imperialism of Our Time', rates Frontline the best English language newsmagazine anywhere in the world, and his verdict is hard to contest. But it is also to be noted that Frontline is the publication of The Hindu, a family-owned group of newspapers with a long and distinguished history, manned by professional journalists.

The most remarkable in this list of remarkable publications, the most open, democratic platform, is EPW.

To those unacquainted with India, it would be hard to explain the enormity of EPW's prestige and its achievements. Unlike any academic journal I know of from anywhere in the world, EPW was born, and has remained, a weekly.

For close to forty years, the journal's pages have been a clearing house of serious ideas on politics, economics, history, sociology, anthropology, and often the sciences as well. In addition to its weekly quota of some four or five academic papers, EPW also publishes, every year, reviews of agriculture, labour, industry, management and gender studies, consisting of about half a dozen commissioned papers by leading authorities in each field.

The very best of Indian social science research has been published by EPW, and often non-Indian academics have chosen to publish theoretical papers here rather than in journals of the west. As an academic journal, EPW holds its own against the best in the world. I have personally known academics who have waited for an year or more to get their name into EPW, for being published there is a mark of recognition for the quality of your research. An EPW citation invariably occupies pride of place in the curriculum vitae of a young scholar in any university anywhere in the world.

In this democratic republic of ideas, an unknown research scholar from an obscure part of the land gets as much space and prominence as an Amartya Sen or Romila Thapar. Over the years, senior bureaucrats, behind the protective shield of pseudonyms, have used the columns of EPW to critique government policy.

There is not a single debate of academic or political importance that has not animated its pages over the last three decades or more, be it the mode of production debate, or the question of imperialism, or underdevelopment, or the debt crisis of the third world, or the debates around subaltern historiography, or on the nature and direction of the Indian polity, or on questions of gender, caste, culture and environment. And remarkably for what was, for a long time, viewed as a journal of the (non-party) left, EPW has opened its pages to virtually every shade of rigorous thought.

But unlike any scholarly journal I know, EPW has also provided lavish space to commentaries on current issues, to columns by a number of top-class but somewhat idiosyncratic writers, to pithy and incisive editorials on a bewildering range of subjects of public concern, and to longer pieces that set out to provoke academic or political debate. In addition, EPW also publishes tables and tables of impeccably researched economic data and statistics, a lively letters to the editor column, and book reviews as well as review articles.

EPW defies every stereotype. It is a small, independent journal employing some twenty staff members on less than modest wages, but its professionalism is the envy of the best and biggest. Not a single issue has ever been delayed for any reason, including the death of its editor. Every single piece that appears in EPW is carefully and meticulously edited for style as well as content. It looks spartan, unostentatious, it is printed on inexpensive newsprint, carries no photographs, and makes no concessions to visual flourish, not even the use of fine typefaces or comfortable inter-line leading.

It is page after page of tightly composed text, and expects to be read with the same urgency as a dictionary or medical reference book. In fact, its functionality is itself an aesthetic, like those old, rugged, metal-bodied SLR cameras.

For a publication that looks nearly intimidating, EPW has phenomenal reach and circulation. University dons as much as undergraduates, corporate bigwigs and financial sector managers, bureaucrats and political leaders, social and political activists, anybody who has anything to do with the world of ideas and the state of the nation reads EPW.

We have all grown up on EPW, debating passionately this or that question that the journal threw at us, waiting anxiously for the issue next week to see how the debate was turning out. And the thrill of receiving the first acceptance note from the editor would surpass for a young scholar the thrill of many weightier honours in future life.

In the 1990s, as the neoliberal reform programme of the Indian economy gathered pace, EPW switched sides and began arguing in favour of the policies of liberalization and globalization.

Opinion on this policy shift was bitterly divided. Left intellectuals, particularly economists, felt a sense of betrayal, rightly so, and some of the best known among them boycotted EPW, perhaps not so rightly. Non- and anti-left liberals welcomed the change, celebrating EPW's 'glasnost'. Whatever one's opinion on the editorial shift, it is uncontested that the journal itself maintained high standards and commanded huge readership.

There is simply no getting away from it: EPW is a magnificent and unique intellectual institution.

On the left, we often think of movements as being more important than individuals, and perhaps they are, but in the process we underrate the individuals who build structures that enable movements to live and thrive.

Krishna Raj was one such man.

A master editor of other people's writing, he also wrote editorials on virtually every subject with care, economy and power. EPW is not a refereed journal. It didn't need to be, not with Krishna Raj in charge. He could debate with the best on most issues, but he chose an anonymous existence, never appearing on television, never granting interviews in print, never signing petitions.

Of all of India's public intellectuals, Krishna Raj was without doubt the most invisible, though arguably the most influential. EPW was his life's passion, his stage and his voice. The journal is what it is because of him, and it is a perfect reflection of his own personality: open, inviting, rigorous, unostentatious, quiet, curious, understated, fiercely independent, forceful.

And his personal integrity was at all times absolutely above the slightest reproach. Even when he turned pro-globalization, he did so not for personal gain - the only individual about whom I can say this - but because he genuinely believed he was right.

Apart from earning for EPW unprecedented stature and goodwill, Krishna Raj also put in place managerial and professional structures - including the ability to raise advertising revenue - that will ensure that EPW will continue to flourish for a long time to come. True to character then, Krishna Raj has ensured that we will not miss him.

But we still will; even those of us who, like me, had minimal personal contact with that gentle, charming man. He touched us all.
........................................................................................

EXAMPLE OF EPW ARTICLE

BOOK REVIEW: India's Nuclear Fantasies: Costs and Ethics

Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream (Itty Abraham In 'Economic and Political Weekly' Dated 28th June 2003)

This volume is the latest and most com- prehensive collection of essays arguing against nuclear weapons in the sub-continent, taking forward and adding to the findings, insights and arguments found in Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik’s path-breaking South Asia on a Short Fuse1 and Smithu Kothari and Zia Mian’s extensive collection of essays and opinion pieces published following the tests of 1998.2

Amartya Sen’s essay, ‘India and the Bomb’, offers the most direct entry point to some of the key questions at stake in the nuclear problem in south Asia. His lucid contribution raises a number of critical issues that can be used to map other articles which go into particular issues in greater depth. These include the tactical and strategic costs of the tests, implications of nuclearisation at a global level, the cost factor, the ethics of nuclearisation, and the anxieties of a post-colonial elite.

On the central question of what India gained from going nuclear, Sen’s answer is, very little. At the domestic politics level, it didn’t help the BJP win state elections. At the tactical level Sen says nuclearisation constrained Indian conventional military options in the efforts to expel the intruders and regain the heights of Kargil.

At the strategic level, it allowed Pakistan to overcome its conventional weakness and claim parity with India on a nuclear scale. These points and the dangers inherent in the Kargil conflict are brought to the fore by Ejaz Haider, a senior editor of Lahore’s Daily Times and Friday Times, in one of the few pieces in the volume not written by an analyst of Indian origin. He reminds us that at least a dozen nuclear threats were made by officials on either side during the conflict, making a mockery of the idea of nuclear weapons deterring conflict; the reverse if anything was true. In fact, he argues, nuclear weapons emboldened the Pakistani military leadership to undertake the operation in the first place. “Pakistan saw its nuclear weapons capability as an ‘equaliser’ against India’s conventional military superiority” (p 136). Ultimately, he notes, international pressure prevented escalation and allowed the cessation of conflict, another blow to Indian strategic policy which seeks to keep the region free of foreign influence.

At the global level, nuclearisation alienated China and hardly furthered Indian ambitions to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Kanti Bajpai addresses the China question directly. He argues that while Indian decision-makers have seen in China the ultimate rationale for their nuclear programme, this perception is fatally flawed. Bajpai demonstrates this in two ways: first, by an examination of China’s India policy and foreign policy objectives, and second, by discussing the China-Pakistan relationship. He notes that “India has never figured in China’s threat cosmology in any serious fashion” (p 36). While Bajpai is realist enough to argue that the Middle Kingdom needs to be watched carefully and that India’s relative ‘military weakness’ is being ignored (p 39), he notes that China has already obtained what it needs as regards the contested border. In other words, in relation to India, China is the status quo power, India the revisionist one. Bajpai stresses the value of the ongoing rounds of discussions between the two countries and suggests that it is hardly in India’s interest to create a permanent enemy of China. That may be so, the hardliners would say, but what of Chinese support of Pakistan? In the most provocative section of his paper, he offers a series of hypothetical reasons for Chinese support of Pakistan, all of which have nothing to do with India. His basic point is, does China really need Pakistan to deter or defeat India? Although Chinese support for Pakistan makes India edgy and nervous, is China supporting Pakistan for other reasons altogether? Bajpai proposes that Chinese assistance to Pakistan has more to do with rewarding Pakistan for its constantcy, limiting US influence in the region, and keeping Muslim separatists in Xinjiang in check.

If this assistance upsets India, that’s a price China is willing to pay. Bajpai suggests that perhaps Pakistan has also shared western military technology with China, for which there is not yet much evidence. What seems more plausible is that Pakistan is also valuable to China in relation to North Korea, offering a low cost and hands-off means of subverting US non-proliferation policy and support for Taiwan. Some of these questions should have been answered in Ye Zhengjia’s disarmingly direct paper on India-China relations. Yet in the ‘officially correct’ manner typical of Chinese scholars of international relations, Ye completely avoids mention of the unpleasant subject of Chinese relations with Pakistan. The paper correctly points out that there still remains a great deal of misunderstanding in India of Chinese motivations, in my view a combination of ignorance bolstered by neo-orientalist western journalism and the absence of a critical mass of first rate scholars of China in India.

All in all, Sen concludes, nuclearisation has set back India’s “national self-defence” vis-a-vis its neighbours. To this prudential concern – was the decision sensible? – is then added the ethical concern of the ‘rightness or wrongness’ of the policy itself. The ethical issue, he argues, is in turn a prudential matter of the highest importance as it is a factor in how we assess each other’s actions. The now present threat of massive devastation and mass murder in the subcontinent cannot, under any circumstances, be considered an ethical policy, especially when set against India’s historic opposition to nuclear weapons.

The ethical questions raised by the nuclearisation of south Asia cannot be dismissed as mere debating points for armchair philosophers. A strong ethical stance underwrote longstanding – for half a century – Indian demands for global nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nuclear weapons convention, and bolstered its opposition to the nuclear asymmetry enshrined in the US-led non-proliferation regime. In retrospect, India’s self-imposed restraint after testing in 1974 added to the moral weight of these demands. These arguments reached their short-lived zenith – and acquired quasi-legal standing – when India submitted a Memorial to the International Court of Justice as it prepared its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons.

Siddharth Mallavarapu presents the details of this historic ruling in his contribution to the volume. Two key aspects of the opinion are worth repeating. First, the special nature of nuclear weapons is clarified; second, the weakening of the principle of national self-defence, insofar as the court agued that self-defence could not be considered independent of principles of humanitarian law. But in the end, the court blinked. It “[could not] conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme case of self-defence in which the very survival of the state would be at stake” (p 255).

While for a long time, it could be taken as obvious that it was the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons that set them apart from other weapons, this position weakened with the development of battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and the enormous leaps in destructive capacity of conventional munitions, especially in the US arsenal. This helps us clarify that it is the long-term effects of nuclear weapons, namely its radiation and environmental effects, which not only affect the present, but which threaten the well-being of future generations and the survival of the eco-system, that make nuclear weapons truly stand apart as weapons of mass destruction.

The effects of radiation are unfortunately already with us. M V Ramana, a physicist and environmentalist at Princeton, and Surendra Gadekar, scientist and co-founder of the anti-nuclear journal Anumukthi, walk us through the horrific effects of the production cycle of the Indian nuclear programme, from the mining of uranium to the fabrication of fuel rods, to waste, reprocessing and testing, and discuss environmental impacts such as ground-water contamination. They make it absolutely clear that in India it makes no sense at all to separate the ‘civilian’ and the ‘military’ programmes on the basis of final use, as some political parties and anti-nuclear groups do, when in practice these systems are completely fused. The evidence presented would have been even more effective if the authors had included a map showing the location of the different sites of reprocessing, production, and extraction, the areas of greatest contamination and their proximity to areas of dense settlement, and the likely routes that nuclear materials and wastes travel across the country. Elsewhere Ramana et al calculated that India has to cope with 5,000 cubic metres (the equivalent of five Olympic-size swimming pools) of high level waste from reprocessing.3 High level waste contains 99 per cent of the total radioactivity from all wastes produced. The harmful effects of this waste will be with us for thousands of years, and there is more being produced daily. Given this, it is not surprising that Thomas George, a physician, describes nuclear weapons as biological weapons (p 449) in his useful summary of the physical effects of radiation on the human body. In a conclusion that brings us into the realm of horror films, he reminds us that following the devastation of nuclear conflagration, insects will rule the world.

The principle of self-defence, an indispensable element of a state’s claim to sovereignty, has long been held as inviolable. But India’s submission to the court noted that even this principle has its limits. In its brief India cited proportionality – the idea that the use of force even for legitimate defence has to be proportionate to the means and ends of the attack; that the use of force must cease once other means, i e, diplomacy, become available; and that where reprisal involves nuclear weapons, their use becomes subject to international humanitarian law. Humanitarian law precludes the targeting of non-combatants and proscribes their needless suffering. The use of nuclear weapons promises both. And if the law is not enough, the Indian submission speaks directly to the non-ethics of deterrence: “deterrence has been considered abhorrent to human sentiment since it implies that a state, if required to defend its own existence, will act with pitiless disregard for the consequences of its [actions on its] own and adversary’s people” (pp 260-61).

We still do not fully understand the transformation that took place between 1996 and 1998. In a matter of two years, the same country that issued the statements above conducted five nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear state. As Sen puts it: “The claim that subcontinental nuclearisation would somehow help to bring about world nuclear disarmament is a wild dream that can only precede a nightmare” (p 187). The easy explanation blames the whole mess on the BJP, or, as Krishna Ananth suggests, on the entire Indian ruling elite.

Political scientist Srirupa Roy agues that the decision to go nuclear must be seen in historical context, situated and justifed within a coherent set of post-colonial state discourses, hence both the origins and the impact of nuclearisation lie outside the nuclear question, narrowly construed. Just as contemporary Hindu nationalism is less of a break from the past than is often imagined, the official frame of Indian nationalism offered the resources, conceptual and material, for a government that sought to go nuclear. “Just as it is impossible to ignore the fact that Hindu nationalism has emerged in India through the working of the existing democratic process, it is also impossible to ignore the ways in which a nuclear India draws upon and reproduces familiar and unquestioned assumptions about national identity and state-society relations” (p 350). Or, by the same logic, going nuclear seeks to affirm and strengthen ‘official’ Indian nationalism. This is tricky ground, because it also forces us to think why forms of destruction become the means by which state continuity and ideological affirmation get reproduced. Is the answer militarism, defined by economist Jean Dreze as “the propensity to use military power, or the threat of it, for political settlement” (p 280), or is it even more structural, an inherent feature of the modern or postcolonial state? The endemic nature of modern warfare and its disproportionate effects in the developing world suggest the latter; be that as it may, it is impossible to deny the staggering impact of war on the process of development, including “material and psychological deprivations associated with entitlement failures, health crises, physical violence, forced displacement, ...[destruction of] productive infrastructure, public services, settlement patterns, environmental resources, social capital and the institutions of governance” (pp 312-13).

The full and sunk costs of nuclearisation are as yet unknown, but economist and journalist Rammanohar Reddy offers a careful and even conservative analysis of the likely costs of the programme in the future. It is worth remembering that the Brookings study of the US nuclear programme, which estimated a total cost of $5 trillion dollars over a half century, found that nuclear weapons themselves were a rather small proportion of the overall costs. Reddy estimates, at a minimum over the next 10 years, the cost of nuclear weapons at Rs 650 crore, the cost of delivery systems at Rs 17,000 crore, the cost of C4I2 (command and control) at Rs 16,000 crore, or Rs 34,000 crore over the decade. When other costs are factored in, including the costs of operating this system, it works out to Rs 7,000-8,000 crore per annum at 1998-99 prices, approximately 0.5 per cent of India’s GDP (pp 273-93), equivalent to the “annual cost of introducing universal elementary education in India” (p 394). Put another way, 7-8 paise of every tax rupee will be spent on this programme (p 393). But what is worse is that these expenditures on nuclear weapons will, in all likelihood, take place alongside an increase in India’s conventional military budget, already 2 per cent of GDP.

Dreze argues that democracies are less likely to be militaristic (in the sense defined above), but notes soberingly that democracy itself is a casualty of militarism. The threats to Indian democracy are real. Nuclear affairs are protected under the colonial era origin Offical Secrets Act with the post-colonial Atomic Energy Act thrown in for good measure. The first casualty of official secrecy is visible in the data used in this volume. Due to the lack of data available from Indian sources, Ramana and Gadekar constantly turn to international comparisons and estimates drawn from extrapolations from international data. Rammanohar Reddy in his analysis of the economics of the Indian nuclear programme adopts the same technique, while making amends for its limitations. With little public information available on India and Pakistan’s planned command and control infrastructures, physicist and activist Zia Mian does a superb job of drawing together existing sources and borrowing from the US experience to construct a careful and comprehensive argument showing the complexity and risks inherent in such an organisation. His point is that there are huge risks ‘built in’, even when the system is working well within its stated parameters.

With all these arguments and data together making a comprehensive case for the lack of benefits from, and the dangers and ethical consequences of nuclearisation, how is it possible that such a programme continues unabated? Sen helps us get a little deeper into this question when he narrows in on the grievances held by Indian elites, and sets them in an international context. He reminds us that India’s scientist-president, Abdul Kalam, is kind-hearted, mild-mannered, amiable, philanthropic, and, an intense nationalist who greeted the bomb with joy. Kalam is a product of what I have elsewhere termed the “strategic enclave” of Indian state scientists,4 the focus of articles by M V Ramana and Amulya K Reddy. Ramana recounts in now familiar detail the important story of how the scientists around Homi Bhabha, present at the founding of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, have become a de facto bomb lobby, restrained only by political leaders. The distinguished scientist Amulya Reddy explores the complicity of modern science with large-scale destruction. He reminds us of the qualitatively new levels of destruction that were reached in second world war by both sides, thanks to the scientisation of death, from genocide in Auschwitz and the concentration camps to the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the only hitherto recorded use of nuclear weapons. This complicity is not necessary, but comes from a failure of morality and will. Reddy notes with dismay how the scientific establishment in India either greeted the tests with joy or remained silent. His diagnosis of the scientific community in India is sociological. He argues that the lure of state patronage post-independence marked the initial fall from grace: with it went scientific independence. Symptoms of decay include the lack of a “community of interacting scientists” (p 198), the “manipulation” of peer review, the marginalisation of unorthodox thinking, and, most telling, the absence of scientific controversies. His insight that the “decoupling” of science and technology in India has led to “abnormality” is also the context for a plea that the natural work of science in India is to address “the country’s defining characteristic and fundamental reality” – poverty (pp 197, 199). Unfortunately, the poverty of Indian state science precludes consideration of this reality.

The grievances held by Indian nuclear scientists may be generalised across the Indian elite, especially the political class. Their obsession is to be taken more seriously – how often do we hear that India is the world’s largest democracy, produces the second (or is it third?) largest pool of scientists and engineers in the world, etc, etc – but this obsession is symptomatic of global tensions that work in contradictory ways. On the one hand, we have to take seriously the fact that considerable segments of the upper middle class urban populations of India delighted in the decision to ‘go nuclear’, whether they voted for the BJP or not.5 Getting the attention of US media and policy-makers remains, for the still-to-be-decolonised, the only measure of world success. They remain oblivious to Sen’s insight regarding their “overestimation of the persuasive power of the bomb [...] and underestimation of the political, cultural, scientific, and economic strength of the country” (p 186). The crudeness of their response, on the other hand, should not blind us to the degree to which American imperial power and military force has become the currency of the day, forcing into disrepute alternative forms of public diplomacy and non-coercive international relations. American-style realism is not alien to India. The constituent assembly debates demonstrate that realism of this kind has been an element of elite discourse about India since independence, a discourse that until given centre-stage by the Hindu right remained embarrassing and marginal. But global nuclear relations have always been the site for the clearest representation of a grossly unequal world system which sanctions weapons of mass destruction only in the hands of a select few. In fact, a simplistic and not unreasonable lesson to learn from contemporary US responses to North Korea and Iraq is how much the presence of nuclear weapons appear to count.

In other words, once we set the south Asian nuclear equation in global terms, the ethical and the prudent diverge sharply. While there is still no substitute, from the point of view of human security, to general and global disarmament, is it a prudent strategy to wait until the difficult conditions for such an agreement are made possible? Or, is it necessary to work on multiple fronts simultaneously, from the regional to the global, seeking to reduce the very real threat of nuclear conflagration wherever possible? Adopting the latter, pragmatic, position is not without its own dilemmas. It means that anti-nuclear activists in south Asia join hands with some elements of the nuclear establishment who argue that the global nuclear forces are no less a threat to world security and that simultaneous reductions in global and regional arsenals are necessary: the adoption of a rigorous and verifiable global convention on nuclear weapons is the minimum goal of such joint efforts. This is not a trivial concern: the rise of US triumphalism has coincided with reports that indicate pressure building up for a resumption of testing and the development of a new generation of US tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, the south Asia anti-nuclear movement must continue its efforts towards mutual restraint in the region.

Should these efforts stop short of rollback for the time being? In the present political conjuncture, there is a case to be made for the presence of nuclear weapons in the region, not to deter the US from attack, but as a form of pressure and bargaining chip that may yet force decision-makers in Washington to reduce their own immense arsenal, based ultimately on their fear of weapons in the hands of people unlike them. This is a dangerous position to adopt; using nuclear weapons as means to an end is a deeply problematic position to take, whether justified in terms of destructive or progressive ends. An interim and unhappy solution offers itself in the formation of a new international regime on the lines of the missile technology control regime (MTCR) which would seek to bring the five old nuclear powers, India, Pakistan and Israel into a mutually binding compact. Such a move would mean the effective end of the discriminatory non-proliferation regime, which is perhaps on its last legs anyway, and its replacement with a new discriminatory system whose only saving grace is that it puts a hold on the expansion of nuclear weapons in south Asia and globally. This would delight the pro-bomb lobby in both India and Pakistan for symbolic reasons but would also impose a form of restraint on them that would make military adventures of the kind south Asia has become all too familiar with in the last few years much more difficult to pull off. Such is the definition of pragmatic.

Whether these proposals are viable or not, the anti-nuclear movement in south Asia, in India in particular, is faced with a dilemma. Five years from the time that the national security states in India and Pakistan formally declared themselves weapons-capable through a series of nuclear tests, little progress has been made in rolling back or capping the nuclear juggernaut in either country. The movement has been proven correct in its analysis – the risks inherent in nuclearisation and misguided faith in the false god of deterrence have been made manifestly visible to all but the wilfully ‘Blind Men of Hindoostan’.6 Being correct, however, is no guarantor of positive change. What restraint there is in the system – declarations of no first use, no further testing, continued adherence to a limited set of confidence-building measures – has been self-imposed by those who decided to carry out these tests. The anti-nuclear movement cannot really take credit for these marginally positive developments nor can it fall back, for all the reasons expressed in this volume, on a wholly justified but politically vacuous response of ‘I told you so’.

In the last instance, India and Pakistan are unlikely to shelve their own programmes once and for all unless enormous pressure is put on them from all fronts. These include the international, the economic and the political. To the extent that the latter front has remained underdeveloped, it remains a fertile zone for the anti-nuclear movement to exploit. In India, this means above all transforming the mindset of regional political formations into taking positions on ‘national’ issues. There are local reasons for doing so, as the cost of sanctions against India for its nuclear follies are disproportionately felt in some parts of the country rather than others, but also because not to do so allows the ostensibly national parties such as the BJP and Congress to fill this vacuum and monopolise some policies ‘in the name of the nation’. As heterogeneous coalitions become the standard form of governance in New Delhi, vernacular nationalisms rooted in local struggles and expressing diverse interests hold out the promise of less bellicose and aggressive expressions of Indian national interest. Only then might it be possible to confront the costs and ethics of India’s nuclear fantasies.

Notes

1 Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999.
2 Smithu Kothari and Zia Mian, eds, Out of the Nuclear Shadow, Zed Books, London and New York, 2001.
3 M V Ramana, Dennis Thomas and Susy Varghese, ‘Estimating Nuclear Waste Production in India, Current Science, 81, no 11 (December 10, 2001), pp 1458-62. Cited on p 433.
4 Itty Abraham, ‘India’s ‘Strategic Enclave’: Civilian Scientists and Military Technologies’, Armed Forces and Society, 18, 2, (Winter 1992), pp 231-52.
5 We still lack rigorous public opinion data on the views of non-elite and non-metropolitan Indians and Pakistanis. Some of the surprising results that may emerge are prefigured in the study of 200 rural and urban Sindhis conducted by Haider Nizamani and reported in ‘Whose Bomb Is It Anyway?’. Full text available on http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/gsc_activities/nizamani.page/
6 K Sundarji, ‘Blind Men of Hindoostan’, Vikas, New Delhi, 1987.

14 November 2007

Collapsed doctrine leads to nuclear fire ...

The Road from Washington to Karachi to Nuclear Anarchy
Are You With Us… or Against Us?

by Jonathan Schell

The journey to the martial law just imposed on Pakistan by its self-appointed president, the dictator Pervez Musharraf, began in Washington on September 11, 2001. On that day, it so happened, Pakistan’s intelligence chief, Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed, was in town. He was summoned forthwith to meet with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who gave him perhaps the earliest preview of the global Bush doctrine then in its formative stages, telling him, “You are either one hundred percent with us or one hundred percent against us.”

The next day, the administration, dictating to the dictator, presented seven demands that a Pakistan that wished to be “with us” must meet. These concentrated on gaining its cooperation in assailing Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, which had long been nurtured by the Pakistani intelligence services in Afghanistan and had, of course, harbored Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda training camps. Conspicuously missing was any requirement to rein in the activities of Mr. A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear arms, who, with the knowledge of Washington, had been clandestinely hawking the country’s nuclear-bomb technology around the Middle East and North Asia for some years.

Musharraf decided to be “with us”; but, as in so many countries, being with the United States in its Global War on Terror turned out to mean not being with one’s own people. Although Musharraf, who came to power in a coup in 1999, was already a dictator, he had now taken the politically fateful additional step of very visibly subordinating his dictatorship to the will of a foreign master. In many countries, people will endure a homegrown dictator but rebel against one who seems to be imposed from without, and Musharraf was now courting this danger.

A public opinion poll in September ranking certain leaders according to their popularity suggests what the results have been. Osama bin Laden, at 46% approval, was more popular than Musharraf, at 38%, who in turn was far better liked than President Bush, at a bottom-scraping 7%. There is every reason to believe that, with the imposition of martial law, Musharraf’s and Bush’s popularity have sunk even further. Wars, whether on terror or anything else, don’t tend to go well when the enemy is more popular than those supposedly on one’s own side.

Are You with Us?

Even before the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq, the immediate decision to bully Musharraf into compliance defined the shape of the policies that the President would adopt toward a far larger peril that had seemed to wane after the Cold War, but now was clearly on the rise: the gathering nuclear danger. President Bush proposed what was, in fact if not in name, an imperial solution to it. In the new dispensation, nuclear weapons were not to be considered good or bad in themselves; that judgment was to be based solely on whether the nation possessing them was itself judged good or bad (with us, that is, or against us). Iraq, obviously, was judged to be “against us” and suffered the consequences. Pakistan, soon honored by the administration with the somehow ridiculous, newly coined status of “major non-NATO ally,” was clearly classified as with us, and so, notwithstanding its nuclear arsenal and abysmal record on proliferation, given the highest rating.

That doctrine constituted a remarkable shift. Previously, the United States had joined with almost the entire world to achieve nonproliferation solely by peaceful, diplomatic means. The great triumph of this effort had been the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under which 183 nations, dozens quite capable of producing nuclear weapons, eventually agreed to remain without them. In this dispensation, all nuclear weapons were considered bad, and so all proliferation was bad as well. Even existing arsenals, including those of the two superpowers of the Cold War, were supposed to be liquidated over time. Conceptually, at least, one united world had faced one common danger: nuclear arms.

In the new, quickly developing, post-9/11 dispensation, however, the world was to be divided into two camps. The first, led by the United States, consisted of good, democratic countries, many possessing the bomb; the second consisted of bad, repressive countries trying to get the bomb and, of course, their terrorist allies. Nuclear peril, once understood as a problem of supreme importance in its own right, posed by those who already possessed nuclear weapons as well as by potential proliferators, was thus subordinated to the polarizing “war on terror,” of which it became a mere sub-category, albeit the most important one. This peril could be found at “the crossroads of radicalism and technology,” otherwise called the “nexus of terror and weapons of mass destruction,” in the words of the master document of the Bush Doctrine, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

The good camp was assigned the job not of rolling back all nuclear weapons but simply of stopping any members of the bad camp from getting their hands on the bomb. The means would no longer be diplomacy, but “preventive war” (to be waged by the United States). The global Cold War of the late twentieth century was to be replaced by global wars against proliferation — disarmament wars — in the twenty-first. These wars, breaking out wherever in the world proliferation might threaten, would not be cold, but hot indeed, as the invasion of Iraq soon revealed — and as an attack on Iran, now under consideration in Washington, may soon further show.

…Or Against Us?

Vetting and sorting countries into the good and the bad, the with-us and the against-us, proved, however, a far more troublesome business than those in the Bush administration ever imagined. Iraq famously was not as “bad” as alleged, for it turned out to lack the key feature that supposedly warranted attack — weapons of mass destruction. Neither was Pakistan, muscled into the with-us camp so quickly after 9/11, as “good” as alleged. Indeed, these distinctions were entirely artificial, for by any factual and rational reckoning, Pakistan was by far the more dangerous country.

Indeed, the Pakistan of Pervez Musharraf has, by now, become a one-country inventory of all the major forms of the nuclear danger.

*Iraq did not have nuclear weapons; Pakistan did. In 1998, it had conducted a series of five nuclear tests in response to five tests by India, with whom it had fought three conventional wars since its independence in 1947. The danger of interstate nuclear war between the two nations is perhaps higher than anywhere else in the world.

*Both Iraq and Pakistan were dictatorships (though the Iraqi government was incomparably more brutal).

*Iraq did not harbor terrorists; Pakistan did, and does so even more today.

*Iraq, lacking the bomb, could not of course be a nuclear proliferator. Pakistan was, with a vengeance. The arch-proliferator A.Q. Khan, a metallurgist, first purloined nuclear technology from Europe, where he was employed at the uranium enrichment company EURENCO. He then used the fruits of his theft to successfully establish an enrichment program for Pakistan’s bomb. After that, the thief turned salesman. Drawing on a globe-spanning network of producers and middlemen — in Turkey, Dubai, and Malaysia, among other countries — he peddled his nuclear wares to Iran, Iraq (which apparently turned down his offer of help), North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others. Seen from without, he had established a clandestine multinational corporation dedicated to nuclear proliferation for a profit.

Seen from within Pakistan, he had managed to create a sort of independent nuclear city-state — a state within a state — in effect privatizing Pakistan’s nuclear technology. The extent of the government’s connivance in this enterprise is still unknown, but few observers believe Khan’s far-flung operations would have been possible without at least the knowledge of officials at the highest levels of that government. Yet all this activity emanating from the “major non-NATO ally” of the Bush administration was overlooked until late 2003, when American and German intelligence intercepted a shipload of nuclear materials bound for Libya, and forced Musharraf to place Khan, a national hero owing to his work on the Pakistani bomb, under house arrest. (Even today, the Pakistani government refuses to make Khan available for interviews with representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency.)

*Iraqi apparatchiks could not, of course, peddle to terrorists, al-Qaedan or otherwise, technology they did not have, as Bush suggested they would do in seeking to justify his war. The Pakistani apparatchiks, on the other hand, could — and they did. Shortly before September 11, 2001, two leading scientists from Pakistan’s nuclear program, Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, the former Director General of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and Chaudry Abdul Majeed, paid a visit to Osama bin Laden around a campfire in Afghanistan to advise him on how to make or acquire nuclear arms. They, too, are under house arrest.

If, however, the beleaguered Pakistani state, already a balkanized enterprise (as the A.Q. Khan story shows) is overthrown, or if the country starts to fall apart, the danger of insider defections from the nuclear establishment will certainly rise. The problem is not so much that the locks on the doors of nuclear installations — Pakistan’s approximately 50 bombs are reportedly spread at sites around the country — will be broken or picked as that those with the keys to the locks will simply switch allegiances and put the materials they guard to new uses. The “nexus” of terrorism and the bomb, the catastrophe the Bush Doctrine was specifically framed to head off, might then be achieved — and in a country that was “for us.”

What has failed in Pakistan, as in smashed Iraq, is not just a regional American policy, but the pillars and crossbeams of the entire global Bush doctrine, as announced in late 2001. In both countries, the bullying has failed; popular passions within each have gained the upper hand; and Washington has lost much of its influence. In its application to Pakistan, the doctrine was framed to stop terrorism, but in that country’s northern provinces, terrorists have, in fact, entrenched themselves to a degree unimaginable even when the Taliban protected Al-Qaeda’s camps before September 11th.

If the Bush Doctrine laid claim to the values of democracy, its man Musharraf now has the distinction, rare even among dictators, of mounting a second military coup to maintain the results of his first one. In a crowning irony, his present crackdown is on democracy activists, not the Taliban, armed Islamic extremists, or al-Qaeda supporters who have established positions in the Swat valley only 150 miles from Islamabad.

Most important, the collapsed doctrine has stoked the nuclear fires it was meant to quench. The dangers of nuclear terrorism, of proliferation, and even of nuclear war (with India, which is dismayed by developments in Pakistan as well as the weak Bush administration response to them) are all on the rise. The imperial solution to these perils has failed. Something new is needed, not just for Pakistan or Iraq, but for the world. Perhaps now someone should try to invent a solution based on imperialism’s opposite, democracy, which is to say respect for other countries and the wills of the people who live in them.

Jonathan Schell is the author of The Fate of the Earth, among other books, and the just-published The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger. He is the Harold Willens Peace Fellow at The Nation Institute, and a visiting lecturer at Yale University.