Showing posts with label Saudi Arabia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Saudi Arabia. Show all posts

21 May 2008

Bush Promises to Give Enriched Uranium to Saudi Arabia

Bush Promises to Give Enriched Uranium to Saudi Arabia

Posted on May 20, 2008 by dandelionsalad

Dandelion Salad

Democracy Now!

May 20, 2008

As US Threatens Iran Over Enriching Uranium, Bush Promises to Give Enriched Uranium to Saudi Arabia

The Bush administration has pledged to support Saudi Arabia’s nuclear power program, including supplying enriched uranium for nuclear reactors. The agreement came out of President Bush’s visit to the Saudi kingdom last week, during which Bush also pledged new US assistance in guarding Saudi oil reserves.

Harvey Wasserman, one of the founders of the grassroots movement against nuclear power. He is senior editor of the Ohio-based freepress.org and the editor of nukefree.org.

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Bush promises Enriched Uranium to Saudis for cheap gas


26 November 2007

John Shirley writes on depleted uranium poisoning

Nukes of the Gulf War

I wrote one of the first articles about Depleted Uranium poisoning (which applied to civilians and enemy soldiers as much as our own people--or more) a few years back. The issue continues--according to a recent AP story: '... six soldiers who have fallen ill since their return from Iraq said Friday that the Army ignored their complaints about uranium poisoning from U.S. weapons fired during combat. They also said they were denied testing for the radioactive substance. "We were all healthy when we left home. Now, I suffer from headaches, fatigue, dizziness, blood in the urine, unexplained rashes," said Sgt. Jerry Ojeda, 28, who was stationed south of Baghdad with other National Guard members of the 442nd Military Police Company." Sgt. Herbert Reed, 50, said that when a dozen soldiers asked for treatment last fall, they initially were turned away....' Here's my original piece, which applies now to our soldiers in Iraq--and to civilians.

by John Shirley

Concealed nerve gas exposure, medical experimentation on soldiers in the field -- could Gulf War military policy get much worse?

How about routine radiation poisoning?

According to the Military Toxins Project, Depleted Uranium (DU), the radioactive byproduct of the uranium enrichment process, is "roughly 60% as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium and has a half-life of 4.5 billion years." The United States has in excess of 1.1 billion pounds of DU waste material.

Waste not, want not. In a perverse twist on recycling, the government currently offers this attractively-dense material free to arms manufacturers. Large and small caliber rounds made of depleted uranium were highly effective in piercing Iraqi armor; tanks incorporating depleted uranium into tank armor effectively resisted penetration. Yet while the Army tested the strategic effectiveness of DU, it skated around health and environmental assessments, as the Army Environmental Policy Institute admitted.

Although munitions such as Tomahawk missiles contain DU in their tips, most DU ammunition was fired from USAF tank-killer aircraft and U.S. tanks employing depleted uranium sabot rounds. The Army reports that it fired 14,000 DU tank rounds during the Gulf War. Over ranges up to and exceeding 3 miles, the Army found DU rounds to be "highly effective in penetrating Iraqi tank armor."

The Air Force's A-10 tank-killer aircraft were used extensively against Iraqi armored vehicles and artillery. The A-10s fired 940,000 of these radioactive rounds -- the equivalent of 564,000 pounds of DU.

When a depleted uranium projectile strikes, up to 70% of the DU penetrator is oxidized and scattered as particulates. According to the U.S. Army, this creates "smoke which contains a high concentration of DU particles. These uranium particles can be ingested and are toxic."

Ironically, while DU armor proved effective in shielding tank crews from impacting rounds, the crews were repeatedly irradiated by their own protection. According to the Military Toxins Project, "the amount of radiation a tank driver receives to his head alone will exceed the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission's] annual standard for public whole-body exposure to man-made sources of radiation. Unfortunately U.S. tank crews were not monitored for radiation exposure during the Persian Gulf War."

American troops came into contact with DU through combat, during the recovery of contaminated U.S. vehicles, and while exploring battlefields after cease fire. Some troops assigned to Kuwait are still being exposed today.

Only after most of the fighting subsided did the Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command warn commanders in the Gulf that "any system struck by a DU penetrator can be assumed to be contaminated by DU." Army studies have found that "personnel inside or near vehicles struck by DU penetrators could receive significant internal exposures." Naturally, this didn't deter the military from using the weapons, since the rounds and armor were found to be highly effective. In the long run, thousands of disguisable American and collateral civilian deaths are acceptable trade-offs for short term military-effectiveness statistics, which benefit the Joint Chiefs -- who, after all, are not at risk from exposure.

As of September 1996, most stateside U.S. soldiers still had not been advised of the dangers of handling or working with DU. Although the Department of Defense and Veterans Administration have provided medical exams to more than 85,000 Gulf War veterans with confirmed health problems, only a handful of these veterans have been tested for DU exposure. Many of these have shown elevated levels of DU in their urine several years after the war.

No battlefield cleanup of DU has come about, nor is a cleanup planned. Locals and still-deployed U.S. troops are being exposed to DU on an ongoing basis. DU particles are transported by the wind and water and are presumed to be migrating into food and water supplies. Children routinely play in and around the hulks of irradiated tanks; soldiers brought irradiated souvenirs home from the battlefield.

Some DU ingested through breathing and wounds lodges permanently in bones and tissue, and acts as a chemical and radiological toxin for the remainder of a person's presumably-shortened lifetime. The Military Toxins Project reports that "large numbers of children near contaminated areas have developed leukemias and other health problems" likely associated with exposure to DU.

The customary military foot-dragging has followed calls for studies on the effects of DU exposure, and there are reasons besides the attractiveness of DU devices. The following segment from the Army Environmental Policy Institute report, leaked in late 1995, reveals a more sinister motive: "The potential for health effects from DU exposure is real; however it must be viewed in perspective... the financial implications of long-term disability payments and healthcare costs would be excessive."

DU rounds are being developed for use in the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Vulcan Air Defense Gun and in new combat helicopters. U.S. defense contractors have sold DU weapons to the United Kingdom, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia and half a dozen other countries.

No warnings or protective gear for DU were issued before the Gulf War, just as soldiers were not alerted to or protected from nerve gas toxins despite continuous alarms from detection systems. The DU legacy is yet another example of radical irresponsibility toward the well-being of American soldiers and battle-area civilians.

How did it happen? How did we come to subject tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers to nerve gas, with health effects complicated by questionable medical countermeasures which actually worsened toxicity, and now radiation poisoning, all while keeping countless human guinea pigs in the dark? How is the military able to justify these abuses and their cover-ups?

It appears to be policy. And policy has no conscience.



Sources:

"Collateral Damage: How U.S. Troops Were Exposed to Depleted Uranium
During the Persian Gulf War," Dan Fahey, Swords to Plowshares Depleted
Uranium Network of the Military Toxins Project.

U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute: Health and Environmental
Consequences of Depleted Uranium in the U.S. Army, Technical Report,
June 1995.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: "Early
Performance Assessment of Bradley and Abrams," January 2, 1992.

The Nation Magazine, October 21, 1996, "The Pentagon's Radioactive
Bullet" by Bill Mesler.

(c) Copyright 1996 ParaScope, Inc.

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John Shirley is the author of numerous books and many, many short stories. His novels include Crawlers, Demons, In Darkness Waiting, and seminal cyberpunk works City Come A-Walkin', and the A Song Called Youth trilogy of Eclipse, Eclipse Penumbra, and Eclipse Corona. His collections include the Bram Stoker and International Horror Guild award-winning Black Butterflies and Really Really Really Really Weird Stories. He also writes for screen (The Crow) and television. As a musician Shirley has fronted his own bands and written lyrics for Blue Õyster Cult and others.


02 November 2007

Britain's Prime Minister Considers Saudi Plan To Give Iran Limited Supply Of Uranium

Britain's Prime Minister Gordon Brown is considering a Saudi plan to limit the supply of uranium to potential nuclear weapons states and will call for new European Union sanctions against Iran in the next few weeks, most probably in the form of an end to export credit guarantees.

U.S.-allied Gulf states said Thursday they are planning a consortium to provide enough enriched uranium for Iran's civil nuclear program, which they believe could be a deterrent against the development of nuclear weapon.

The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, who announced the plan, discussed it with his British counterpart, David Miliband, during the Saudi state visit this week. The prince also held talks with Brown.

The prime minister, who is concerned that the technological division between civilian and military nuclear use is starting to blur, has been struck by the potential of using supply quotas to limit weapons technology. The Bush Administration believes that Iran's stated aim of developing a civilian program is a smokescreen for development of a nuclear weapon.

The five members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany are due to meet in London Friday to discuss a fresh round of sanctions against Iran over its failure to comply with previous U.N. resolutions. Britain is not optimistic that either Russia or China will agree to a third round of U.N.-sponsored sanctions, but believes the alternative of fresh E.U. sanctions is necessary. Germany, seen as one of the least enthusiastic supporters of fresh sanctions in the E.U., said it was willing to look at the issue in the middle of December.

Brown believes diplomatic and economic pressure is having an impact on the Iranian regime, but would like the E.U. to agree to tighten sanctions, in part to head off any faction in Washington, D.C., arguing for some kind of military assault. The prime minister has refused to publicly rule out military force against Iran.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries - Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates - agree with the western assessment that Iran's nuclear energy program could lead to it acquiring atomic bombs. "We have proposed a solution, which is to create a consortium for all users of enriched uranium in the Middle East," Prince Saud told the Middle East Economic Digest.

Prince Saud said Iran was considering the offer, which involves building a plant in a neutral country such as Switzerland. "Any plant in the Middle East that needs enriched uranium would get its quota. I don't think other Arab states would refuse. Other Arab countries have expressed a desire to be part of the proposal."

Britain's Foreign Office said any proposal on the controlled supply of enriched uranium did not lift the responsibility on Tehran to comply with previous U.N. resolutions.

politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,,2203909,00.html